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INTRODUCTION
The three chapters comprising the main body of this dissertation all evaluate
investment decisions by applying the theory of real options. Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 both analyze optimal investment strategies in ﬂexible technology.
Section 1.1.1 gives motivation for these chapters.
Chapter 4 studies the optimal timing decision of technology adoption. The
second part of the motivation is devoted to Chapter 4. Section 1.2 summarizes
the contents of the chapters.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Investment in Flexible Technology
There can be no doubt concerning the increasing importance of ﬂexible tech-
nologies in many sectors of industry. The automotive industry is an excel-
lent example of a sector where the importance of ﬂexibility is at an all-time
high(Chappell(2005)). Historically, automotivemanufacturersreliedonhigh-
volume and inﬂexible plants with two, or even three assembly lines making
the same vehicle. This situation changed with the entry of Japanese manufac-
turers and continuing product proliferation. There are very few car models
now for which demand is large enough to justify dedicating an entire plant to
their production (Goyal et al. (2006)). Because of the use of ﬂexible manufac-
turing systems, Japan became a serious competitor in the automotive indus-
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try. Flexible assembly lines allow a manufacturer to assemble multiple types
of cars with varying interior equipment, color, engine etc. on the same assem-
bly line. When the sale of one type of car falls, the manufacturer can easily
decide to shift a bigger part of the production to another type of car, which
can also be assembled on the same production line. This demonstrates a big
advantage of ﬂexible manufacturing systems, especially for car models that
face highly volatile demand. Opposed to the ﬂexible manufacturing system is
the dedicated manufacturing system. In such a system there is no ﬂexibility
in the sense that each product needs its own assembly line.
With the term “value of ﬂexibility” I indicate throughout this thesis how
valuable a ﬂexible manufacturing system is opposed to a dedicated manufac-
turing system. In the situation of uncertain demand, ﬁrms would like to be
able to shift some production around within their capacity (Goyal and Netes-
sine (2007)). This means that the value of ﬂexibility is higher in an uncertain
market, a result that was conﬁrmed by many researchers in the literature.
While the Japanese automotive industry lead the way in manufacturing
with ﬂexible systems, the North American ﬁrms where lagging behind, in-
stalling fewer ﬂexible systems. This was partly due to the high costs of acqui-
sition of ﬂexible systems and to the lack of appropriate evaluation methods
that measure the advantages of ﬂexibility correctly (Li and Tirupati (1994)).
This is widely seen as one of the main reasons that allowed the Japanese auto-
motive industry to take a great share of the total market size. In August 2004,
Toyota Motor Co. reported a quarterly proﬁt of 2.6 billion dollars, which was
higher than the combined proﬁts of rivals General Motors and Ford Motor.
Toyota credited simpler and more modular car designs, platform sharing, and
ﬂexible capacity for increasing its quarterly operating proﬁt by $361 million
(Van Mieghem (2008)). With a delay, also the North American automotive
industry started investing heavily in product ﬂexibility. Recently, Ford, for ex-
ample, adopted ﬂexibility in 75% of its 21 North American Assembly plants
and also General Motors underwent crucial investments (Goyal et al. (2006)).
Empirical studies indicate that the available tools for evaluating the cost/
beneﬁt tradeoffs of investment in ﬂexible manufacturing systems are often
contradicting to the intuition of managers, many of whom perceive signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁts from acquiring ﬂexible manufacturing systems (Fine and Freund
(1990)). Van Mieghem (2008) states that the greatest obstacle to achieving ﬂex-
ibility is the fact that ﬂexible assets cost more than dedicated or inﬂexible do,
while it is difﬁcult to measure, value and convey their beneﬁts. The three main
value sources or “drivers” of ﬂexibility are (1) scale economies, (2) diversiﬁ-CHAPTER 1 3
cation and (3) allocation ﬂexibility and information updating. The third value
driver of ﬂexibility stems from contingent decision making, which provides
two real options: the option to wait for more information, and the option to
switch capacity allocation or adapt capacity utilization.
One needs to understand the speciﬁc advantages of ﬂexible technologies
andtakethisknowledgeintoaccountwhenbuildinginvestmentdecisionmod-
els. In order to include all crucial aspects that should be considered when
making investment decisions in general, and speciﬁcally when considering
ﬂexible technology, I explicitly take into account technological ﬂexibility, un-
certainty, investment timing and size in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. The
main focus is on the use of ﬂexible capacity to hedge against uncertainty in
future demand. Continuous time models are designed in order to apply the
real options methodology to these problems. In particular, this allows to es-
tablish the effect of uncertainty on the value of ﬂexibility within a dynamic
framework. The use of the real options approach implies that the optimal tim-
ing of investment can be determined. In reality ﬁrms have the opportunity to
wait with their investment until the market is big enough to enter with their




led to a shift in production from dedicated to ﬂexible production systems. Re-
cent developments in manufacturing technologies permit the production of
a wide variety of products, allow to adapt product mix as well as produc-
tion volume with small changeover costs and to react rapidly in the case of
changes, whether predicted or unpredicted. Global competition, short prod-
uct cycles as well as highly volatile demand have made it necessary for ﬁrms
to introduce advanced technologies such as ﬂexible manufacturing systems.
But these modern technologies are typically capital intensive and capacity ad-
ditions require substantial investments.
The subject of the economics of ﬂexibility has been of interest to economists
for a long time (for many references see Jones and Ostroy (1984)). In the op-
erations management literature the investment in ﬂexible technologies has re-
ceived signiﬁcant attention only during the last two decades, following the
increasing viability of ﬂexible, computer controlled manufacturing systems
(Fine and Freund (1990)). The issue of ﬂexibility as a tool to better deal with
demand uncertainty, has been discussed in the current operations manage-4 INTRODUCTION
ment literature. Firms have to determine the optimal investment type (ﬂexi-
ble/ dedicated), optimal (lumpy/incremental) capacity to invest in, and the
occupation rate of the capacity. Examples are Bish and Wang (2004), who
discuss the value of ﬂexibility for a monopolist and ﬁnd that its investment
decision follows a threshold policy. Chod and Rudi (2005) discuss two dif-
ferent values of ﬂexibility, namely, resource ﬂexibility and responsive pric-
ing. Van Mieghem (1998) studies optimal investment in ﬂexible manufac-
turing capacity as a function of product prices (margins), investment costs
and multivariate demand uncertainty. Goyal and Netessine (2007) study the
impact of competition on a ﬁrm’s choice of technology (product-ﬂexible or
product-dedicated) and capacity investment decision in an economic envi-
ronment characterized by price-dependent and uncertain demand. However,
most contributions have one big limitation: the use of static models. And
therefore, they do not include the dynamic aspect of ﬂexible capacity.
Timing of Investment
Most investment decisions posses three important characteristics. First, the in-
vestment is partially or completely irreversible and involves some sunk costs.
Second, there is uncertainty over the future rewards from the investment.
Third, there is some ﬂexibility about the timing of investment. One can post-
pone the investment to get more information about the future. To evaluate
such investment decisions the theory of real options is used.
Theideabehindrealoptionstheoryisthataninvestmentopportunityshows
an analogy with a call option in ﬁnancial markets: while a call option gives its
owner the right but not the obligation, to buy a stock somewhere in the future,
a ﬁrm having an investment opportunity has the right, but not the obligation,
to buy an asset somewhere in the future. In order to stress this analogy, this
investment opportunity is therefore called a “real option”. At the moment
that the ﬁrm actually makes the irreversible investment expenditure, the ﬁrm
exercises, or loses, the real option. This reﬂects that at this time the ﬁrm gives
up the option to delay the investment. Delaying the investment can be beneﬁ-
cial due to the new information that may arrive over time. Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) provide an introduction to the real options approach and a review of
early contributions.CHAPTER 1 5
Investment Size
When investing, it is not only the timing that is important but also the scale of
investment. By investing at a large scale the ﬁrm takes a risk in case of uncer-
tain demand. In particular, revenue may be too low to defray the investment
costifex-postdemandturnsouttobedisappointinglylow. Ontheotherhand,
large scale investment gives a high revenue in case of a high demand realiza-
tion. In the automotive industry, for example, manufacturers’ decisions on
investing in production capacity are very critical. On the one hand, expand-
ing already installed capacity is very expensive (Andreou (1990)). Therefore,
the installed capacity must be sufﬁcient for the whole life cycle of the product
and easily adaptable to new product lines. On the other hand, the proﬁtability
of the products are threatened by low utilization of capacity as well as under-
capacity.
However, most real option models only determine the optimal timing of an
investment project of given size. The fact that this theory has focused more
on timing of the investment than on the size of the investment has been al-
ready brought up, amongst others, by Hubbard (1994) in a review of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994).
Manne (1961) was one of the ﬁrst to determine an optimal capacity level of
a monopolistic ﬁrm within a new facility, incorporating the timing issue using
a random walk. Manne (1961) ﬁnds that when uncertainty increases, the ﬁrm
will invest in a larger capacity level. Anupindi and Jiang (2008) implement a
limited version of the timing issue in a competitive market, by employing a
three-stage decision model. They model a market where ﬁrms optimize ca-
pacity, production, and price. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) observe the value
of ﬂexibility under the optimization of both timing and the intensity of the
investment. Analogous to Dangl (1999), they ﬁnd that uncertainty delays in-
vestment and increases the size of investment.
1.1.2 Technology Adoption Timing
The technological progress has speeded up enormously during the last cen-
tury. While it took a century for the telephone to expand from a simple gadget
of privileged citizens to an ’unimaginable to do without’ commodity of daily
use, thecellphoneunderwentthisprocesswithinjustonedecade1. Newmod-
1See http://visualizingeconomics.com/2008/02/18/adoption-of-new-technology-since-
1900/ for a historical graph showing the adoption of new technologies in the United States
since 1900.6 INTRODUCTION
els and technological improvements arrive every day, getting faster, smaller
and cover a wider range of needs. Firms as well as individual consumers have
not just the ﬂexibility to decide when to invest in new technology but also the
choice of which new technology innovation to adopt. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to consider models that take into account both, the timing of technology
investment as well as the fact that several new technologies appear, when
analyzing technology investment decisions. The theoretical models of adop-
tion timing can be classiﬁed in four groups, according whether the particular
model deals with uncertainty regarding the arrival and value of a new tech-
nology and/or strategic interaction in the product market (see Hoppe (2002)
and Huisman (2001) for good overviews). The model in Chapter 4 contributes
to the stream of theoretical models of adoption timing in which the proﬁtabil-
ity of a new technology and/or the rate of technological progress is uncertain.
A ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to adopt if and only if the estimate of the prof-
itability of adoption exceeds a certain value and if it is not more proﬁtable to
wait for new information on the arrival of better technology (Hoppe (2002)).
Uncertainty about the value of a new technology reduces or increases a ﬁrm’s
adoption incentive at any date, while the possibility of resolving uncertainty
over time by receiving more information about the arrival and value of new
technology depicts an incentive to delay adoption.
Speciﬁcally, Chapter 4 follows up on work of Huisman (2001) that studies
a decision theoretic model of technology adoption of a monopolist. Huisman
applies real options methods to the problem of technology adoption of a ﬁrm
that faces uncertainty about both the value and arrival of new technology.
He extends the traditional decision theoretic models on technology adoption
with a model in which technologies arrive according to a Poisson process.
One limitation of Huisman (2001) is that the arrival rate of new technologies
is constant. This is however a rather strong assumption for many applications
in practice. Chapter 4 relaxes this assumption taking into account that the
arrival rate of new technologies can change over time.
1.2 Overview of Chapters
In Chapter 2 we analyze the investment and production decisions of a monop-
olist in a stochastic dynamic environment. Uncertainty is present in the sense
that the future demand level is unknown and dynamics is taken into account
by adopting a continuous time framework. Before the ﬁrm is able to produce
goods it has to install capacity. The ﬁrm has to choose the optimal time as wellCHAPTER 1 7
as investment size. Once capacity is installed, the ﬁrm can decide the optimal
production level. We allow for production ﬂexibility where at each moment in
time production can ﬂuctuate between zero and the capacity level without ad-
ditional adjustment costs when adapting production to demand. This chapter
is based on (Hagspiel et al., 2011, a).
We ﬁnd that the initial occupation rate of the ﬂexible ﬁrm can be quite
low, especially when investment costs are concave and demand uncertainty
is high. In order to show the implications of production ﬂexibility, we study
the case of the inﬂexible ﬁrm, where the ﬁrm is restricted to a ﬁxed output
rate. Comparing the optimal investment decision of both ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that
the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests in higher capacity than the inﬂexible ﬁrm. The capac-
ity difference increases with uncertainty. Regarding the timing of investment
there are two contrary effects. On the one hand the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an incen-
tive to invest earlier, because production ﬂexibility increase the value of the
project. While on the other hand, the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an incentive to invest
later, because the higher capacity level makes investment more costly. The
later effect dominates when uncertainty is high.
The contribution of Chapter 3 is three-fold. First, I derive and analyze the
optimal investment strategy in product-ﬂexible contrary to product-dedicated
manufacturing systems of a ﬁrm operating in an economic environment char-
acterized by uncertain demand. The ﬁrm is a price setting monopolist that is
selling two products that differ in substitutability and proﬁtability. Similar to
Chapter 2 a continuous time framework is applied with the future demand
level assumed to be uncertain and following a stochastic process. I derive
the optimal investment strategy for the case of ﬂexible and dedicated capac-
ity separately in the ﬁrst run. The following three decisions of the ﬁrm are
optimized. First, when is it optimal to invest, i.e. the investment timing. Sec-
ond, how much capacity to install, i.e. the size of investment. And third,
once capacity has been installed, how to optimally use this capacity. Here the
use of product-ﬂexible capacity distinguishes from dedicated capacity. Flexi-
ble capacity allows the ﬁrm to switch costlessly between products and handle
changes in relative volumes among products in a given product mix. Dedi-
cated capacity restricts to manufacture one speciﬁc product. I ﬁnd that in the
ﬂexible case, under high demand the ﬁrm just produces the most proﬁtable
product. If demand is low the ﬁrm produces both products to make total mar-
ket demand bigger. In the dedicated case the ﬁrm invests in both capacities
only if the substitutability rate is low and proﬁtability of both products high
enough. Otherwise, it restricts investment to one dedicated capacity for the8 INTRODUCTION
more proﬁtable product.
Second, I compare the two investment strategies and specify the value of
ﬂexibility. Here I ﬁnd that ﬂexibility especially pays off when uncertainty is
high, substitutability low, and proﬁt levels between the two products are sub-
stantially different. In a third step, I change the model setup in Chapter 3 and
consider a ﬁrm’s decision to change from producing with dedicated to pro-
ducing with ﬂexible capacity. Analyzing the optimal timing of the switch, I
ﬁnd that the speciﬁc product combination has a remarkably high impact on
the ﬁrm’s decision. Chapter 3 is based on Hagspiel (2011).
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature of technology adoption. Our model
builds on the model presented in (Huisman, 2001, Chapter 2). We investigate
the role of a ﬁrm that decides about technology adoption with an investment
to change from old to new technology facing uncertain improvement size and
timing of future technology improvements. The ﬁrm’s adoption decision is
described as the solution of an inﬁnite horizon dynamic programming prob-
lem in a continuous time setting. The technological process is assumed to
advance exogenously to the ﬁrm. Once the ﬁrm decides to adopt new tech-
nology it faces large ﬁxed cost. Unlike prevalent in the technology adoption
literature, we assume that the arrival rate of new technology is not constant
but changing over time. Chapter 4 is based on (Hagspiel et al., 2011, b).
The improved modeling of technological innovation arrival allows us to
explain the fact that ﬁrms often adopt new technology a time lag after its ar-
rival, while models with constant arrival rate neglect this phenomenon. Fur-
thermore, it adds to the signiﬁcance of our results by one additional degree
of freedom and allows to study the effect of variance of time between two
consecutive technology arrivals. Depending on whether the arrival rate is as-
sumed to change or be constant over time, the optimal technology adoption
timing changes signiﬁcantly. Our analysis shows that the probability of a time
lag between innovation and adoption is substantially high. We present two
possible applications of the model and analyze numerical examples suited to
those.CHAPTER 2
PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY AND CAPACITY
INVESTMENT UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY1
This chapter takes a real option approach to consider optimal capacity invest-
ment decisions under uncertainty. Besides the timing of the investment, the
ﬁrm also has to decide on the capacity level. Concerning the production de-
cision, we study a ﬂexible and an inﬂexible scenario. The ﬂexible ﬁrm can
costlessly adjust production over time with the capacity level as the upper
bound, while the inﬂexible ﬁrm ﬁxes production at capacity level from the
moment of investment onwards.
We ﬁnd that the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests in higher capacity than the inﬂexible
ﬁrm, where the capacity difference increases with uncertainty. For the ﬂexible
ﬁrm the initial occupation rate can be quite low, especially when investment
costs are concave and the economic environment is uncertain. As to the timing
of the investment there are two contrary effects. First, the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an
incentive to invest earlier, because ﬂexibility raises the project value. Second,
the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an incentive to invest later, because costs are larger due to
the higher capacity level. The latter effect dominates in highly uncertain eco-
nomic environments. Investment in ﬂexible capacity leads to a signiﬁcantly
larger expected project value than for inﬂexible capacity, especially in case of
highly volatile demand.
1This chapter is based on (Hagspiel et al., 2011, a).
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2.1 Introduction
Nowadays ﬁrms often face high demand volatility. This uncertainty in de-
mand inﬂuences the desirability to invest in production capacity, the choice of
the capacity level, and it raises the value of being able to adapt the produc-
tion decision. Bengtsson and Olhager (2002) argue that, in order to cope with
unpredictable changes in demand, the ﬁrm needs to possess some degrees of
ﬂexibility in order to stay competitive and proﬁtable. We analyze the invest-
ment and production decisions of the monopolist in a stochastic dynamic en-
vironment. Uncertainty is present in the sense that the future demand level is
unknown and dynamics is taken into account by adopting a continuous time
framework. Consumers’ demand is driven by a demand intercept following a
geometric Brownian motion. Before the ﬁrm is able to produce goods, it has to
install capacity. In deciding about capacity investment the ﬁrm has to choose
the timing as well as the capacity level. Once the capacity is installed, the
ﬁrm can decide about the production level. We allow for production ﬂexibil-
ity where at each moment in time production can ﬂuctuate between zero and
the capacity level without facing additional adjustment costs. A main input
for the production decision is the current consumer demand level.
The current demand level is also the main input for the investment deci-
sion. In particular, we show in this study that three demand level regions can
be distinguished. In the ﬁrst region demand is so low that the ﬁrm will not
invest. In the second region demand is at an intermediate level, implying that
investment is optimal but initially the ﬁrm does not produce up to capacity.
The corresponding occupation rate can be quite low, especially if there is a lot
of demand uncertainty and when the investment cost function is concave. The
intuition is based on the known result in the literature that, once uncertainty is
large, then it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest late in a large capacity level (Bar-
Ilan and Strange (1999) and Dangl (1999)). Assuming an concave investment
cost function an additional unit of investment is relatively cheap when the in-
vestment magnitude is large so that, once the ﬁrm decides to install a large
capacity, it is relatively cheap to make this capacity “very large” implying that
the ratio between current production and capacity will be small. Indeed, the
occupation rate is signiﬁcantly higher when investment costs are convex. We
also show that the gap between the moment of investing in capacity and the
moment where the ﬁrm uses full capacity for the ﬁrst time is very large and
increases more than proportionally with uncertainty. In the third region de-
mand is so high that the ﬁrm immediately starts producing at full capacityCHAPTER 2 11
after the investment.
In order to show the implications of production ﬂexibility, we also study
the case of the inﬂexible ﬁrm, where the ﬁrm is restricted to a ﬁxed production
rate. The capacity choice at the moment of the investment ﬁxes the inﬂexible
ﬁrm’s quantity at which it will produce forever. We show that the ﬂexible ﬁrm
invests in larger capacity. This effect is reinforced by uncertainty. As to the
timing of the investment there are two contrary effects. On the one hand the
ﬂexible ﬁrm has an incentive to invest earlier, because production ﬂexibility
increases the value of the project. On the other hand, the ﬂexible ﬁrm has an
incentive to invest later, because the higher capacity level makes investment
more costly. The latter effect dominates as uncertainty goes up.
In today’s economy production ﬂexibility is an important means to adjust
to ﬂuctuations in demand. During the credit crunch recession that started in
2008thedemandinthecarindustrydroppedsigniﬁcantly. Companiesreacted
by downscaling production, which resulted in low occupation rates2. Another
example is the LCD industry. During its initial stage (2003-04) production ﬂex-
ibility was not crucial because ﬁrms were producing at full capacity. The rea-
son was that capacity was lagging behind demand, since it took about one to
two years to build these advanced and expensive production facilities, while
demand for the new products was high. Later on competition on the sup-
ply side led to overcapacity, implying that production ﬂexibility became a far
more important issue3.
Production ﬂexibility is to some extent determined by ﬂexibility of labor.
One might criticize that a ﬁrm’s potential to ﬂexible adapt output is strongly
curtailed by legal constraints. However, as recently shown during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis (2008-2011), even in European countries with traditionally tight la-
bor laws, governments were reacting fast to the industry’s call for possibilities
2In January 2009, for example, Honda forced British workers to start an enforced four-
month layoff against the backdrop of a further dire warning over the trading outlook from
the Japanese car giant. See article “Honda suspends UK workers for 16 weeks” published by
’The Times’ on January 30, 2009. Toyota even closed down several of its factories in Japan for
a few days as a consequence to the ﬁnancial crisis. See, for example, the article “Toyota in
11-day factory shutdown” published by Guardian on January 6, 2009.
3Onthesitehttp://www.purchasing.com/article/340083-LCD_prices_will_fall_in_fourth
_quarter.php it is stated that “LCD prices increased 30–40% this year because of production
cutbacks by LCD manufacturers. Suppliers had a disastrous fourth quarter 2008 and cut pro-
duction. Factory utilization rates fell to 30% at some suppliers with the average being about
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in cutting working hours in order to down-scale production4.
Our work adds to two streams of literature. The ﬁrst stream considers the
issue of production ﬂexibility. The value of production ﬂexibility has been
brought up in the literature mainly considering two- or three-stage decision
models. In order to consider the dynamic character of production ﬂexible
capacity, i.e. to adapt production ﬂexible to demand changes over time by
scaling down or up, we adopt a continuous time setting. This also allows us
to consider the investment timing decision.
An important difference between our setup and the multi-stage models is
that we adopt a continuous time framework. This enables us to analyze the
timing of the investment, where we establish that uncertainty delays invest-
ment and that a ﬂexible ﬁrm both has incentives to invest earlier or later than
an inﬂexible ﬁrm. Anupindi and Jiang (2008) consider a model where ﬁrms
make decisions on capacity, production, and price under demand uncertainty
in a three-stage decision making framework. In their model the ﬁrm always
decides about capacity before and price after the demand realization, while
there is a difference in the timing of the production decision. A ﬂexible ﬁrm
can postpone production decisions until the actual demand curve is observed,
while the inﬂexible cannot. Our results that capacity increases with uncer-
tainty and ﬂexibility coincide with Anupindi and Jiang’s ﬁnding that, when
the market is more volatile, ﬂexibility allows a ﬁrm to increase investment in
capacity and earn a higher proﬁt. Chod and Rudi (2005) conﬁrm this result
as well. They study two types of ﬂexibility - resource ﬂexibility and respon-
sive pricing. The ﬁrm is selling two products facing linear demand curves for
these products. They consider a situation in which a single ﬂexible resource
can be used to satisfy two distinct demand classes, where they characterize
the effects of demand variability and demand correlation. As Anupindi and
Jiang (2008) they do not consider the timing issue of this investment problem
but apply a two-stage decision problem.
Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) consider a two stage model where demand
is linear with a stochastic intercept. The ﬁrm has to decide about capacity
investment, production (inventory) quantity and price. They analyze several
strategies which differ in the timing of the operational decisions (i.e. capacity,
output and price) relative to the realization of uncertainty and show how the
4In consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis many European countries introduced or extended
the possibilities for “Kurzarbeit”. This model, ﬁrst established in Germany, is a short-term,
recession-related program in which companies have entered into an agreement to avoid
laying-off any of their employees by instead reducing the working hours of all or most of
their employees, with the government making up some of the employees’ lost income.CHAPTER 2 13
different strategies inﬂuence the strategic investment decision of the ﬁrm and
its value. Similar characteristics to our ﬂexible production shows their formal-
ization of “production postponement strategies”. Though, they restrict their
work to a static environment.
The second stream of literature deals with the theory of real options, which
mainly considers problems where a ﬁrm must ﬁnd the optimal time to invest
in a certain project (McDonald and Siegel (1985) and McDonald and Siegel
(1986)). In general, this literature acknowledges partial irreversibility of in-
vestment and predicts that uncertainty delays investment. The real options
theory is elaborately comprised in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The fact that this
theoryhasfocusedmoreonthetimingoftheinvestmentthanonthesizeofthe
investment has been brought up already in a review of this book by Hubbard
(1994). He argues that“the new view models...do not offer speciﬁc predictions
aboutthelevelofinvestment”. Hubbard(1994)claimsthatinordertotakethis
extra step“it requires the speciﬁcation of structural links between the marginal
proﬁtability of capital and the desired capital stock (the usual research focus
in the traditional, neoclassical literature)”.
However, there are still a few real options papers that, besides the timing,
also consider the size of the investment. Dixit (1993) picks up the capacity
choice issue by evaluating a model with irreversible choice among mutually
exclusive projects under uncertainty. He considers a project with output price
uncertainty, sunk capital cost but no operating cost. Decamps et al. (2006)
renew this model, reducing it to a choice among two alternative investment
projects of different scales. They provide parameter restrictions under which
the optimal investment strategy is not a trigger strategy and the optimal in-
vestment region is dichotomous. Lee and Shin (2000) determine the relation-
ship between investment and uncertainty exploring the role of a variable in-
put, e.g. labor, in striking a balance between a positive effect, due to the con-
vexity of the proﬁt function, and a negative effect, due to the usual option
value of waiting.
Bar-IlanandStrange(1999)considerboththetimingandintensityofinvest-
ment. Furthermore, they examine the evaluation of capital stock under incre-
mental and lumpy investment. In the ’lumpy’ investment model of Bar-Ilan
and Strange the investment project is such that by paying a ﬁxed investment
cost the ﬁrm receives a production technology that allows it to produce for-
ever at a certain production rate. This also holds for our inﬂexible ﬁrm model.
In contrast to Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) we also study the optimal decisions
of a ﬂexible ﬁrm, where we allow for ﬂexibility in the production level at any14 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
instant after the investment time.
ThepapermostcloselyrelatedtoourworkisDangl(1999). Thesetupofour
model is similar to Dangl (1999) in the sense that the ﬁrm has to determine the
investment timing and the investment size. However, Dangl concentrates on
the effect of demand uncertainty on these investment decisions. We elaborate
on his paper by analyzing the speciﬁc implications of production ﬂexibility
on investment timing and size. Therefore we derive also the optimal invest-
ment strategy in inﬂexible capacity. This allows us to analyze the difference
of optimal investment strategies in production ﬂexible and inﬂexible capacity.
respectively. While Dangl does not address the possibility of investing in the
third region, i.e. demand is so large that directly after the investment the ﬁrm
produces at full capacity, we show that for speciﬁc situations this is the opti-
mal strategy for the ﬁrm. We analyze these scenarios and present examples
and illustrations for this case.
Recent work of Chronopoulos et al. (2011) also takes into account both tim-
ing and size of investment. They analyze the impact of risk aversion as well
as operational ﬂexibility in the form of suspension and resumption options on
these decision. Similar to us they do not take into account suspension costs.
Production ﬂexibility is not considered in their model. When the ﬁrm is in an
operating mode, it always produces up to full capacity. Among other results,
they ﬁnd that increasing risk aversion facilitates investment and reduces the
optimal capacity of the project. Operational ﬂexibility increases the value of
the investment opportunity and therefore, the incentive to invest, resulting in
the decrease of the optimal capacity size. The option to suspend operations
when demand is to low and resume operations again when demand increases
is already considered in early real options literature, like the pioneering work
of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985). Adkins
and Paxson (011b) recently presented a two factor multiple switching option
model, with switching from an operating state with an option to suspend op-
erations, or from suspended state to an operating state, when both output
price and input cost are stochastic and switching is costly. They provide the
value of such facilities and the optimal switching input and output triggers
and present an illustration for an heavy crude oil ﬁeld production which re-
quires natural gas as an input, with shut-down and start-up switching costs.
The paper is structured as follows. Beyond this introduction we present
the model for the ﬂexible and the inﬂexible ﬁrm in Section 2.2, where we also
develop results regarding the timing and the size of the investment. In this
framework the investment cost function is concave while demand is linear.CHAPTER 2 15
Section 2.3 contains results about the occupation rate and the effects of pro-
duction ﬂexibility. Section 2.4 looks into some robustness issues, where we
analyze the impact of different investment cost and demand functions. In par-
ticular we study the cases of convex investment cost and iso-elastic demand.
Section 2.5 concludes. The appendix contains additional mathematical results
and proofs.
2.2 Model, Size and Timing of Investment
2.2.1 Flexible Case
Consider a ﬁrm that has to decide about capacity investment. This involves
two decisions, namely when to invest and determining the size of the capacity.
After the investment is made the ﬁrm is able to produce goods. Production is
ﬂexible so that it can be adapted to demand changes, while it is bounded by
the capacity size.
The investment costs are sunk and, following Dangl (1999), assumed to be
equal to I(K) = dKl, in which K stands for the capacity level while l is a
constant being less than one. This means that the marginal investment costs
are decreasing with increasing installed capacity. Later on, in the robustness
section we study the implications of a convex investment cost function.
Denote production quantity at time t by qt. Since production cannot exceed
capacity, it holds that
0  qt  K. (2.1)
The ﬁrm is uncertain about future demand. Adopting a linear demand
structure we have
p(qt,t) = qt   gqt, (2.2)
where p(qt,t) is price, g is a positive constant, and demand uncertainty is
modeled by fqtg following the geometric Brownian motion
dqt = aqtdt + sqtdWt. (2.3)
In this expression a is the trend parameter, s is the volatility parameter, and
dWt is the increment of a Wiener process. From now on we drop the time
subscript whenever there can be no misunderstanding.
The ﬁrm’s production costs are ﬁxed and denoted by c. It follows that the
proﬁt ﬂow is
p(q) = p(q)q   cq. (2.4)16 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Given the demand is equal to q, the optimal output rate, q, is determined by
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(2.5)
Production will be temporarily suspended5 when q falls below c, and resumed
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(q   gK   c)K for q  2gK + c.
(2.6)
In order to ﬁnd the expected discounted value of this investment project
(V(q,K)), we apply the dynamic programming approach. Then this value
function must satisfy the Bellman equation





where r is the (constant) discount rate. Applying Ito’s Lemma, substituting
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Solving this equation for V(q,K), considering that we have three different
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b   r = 0. (2.10)
5As an example notice that in Japan Toyota suspended production for 11 days during the
credit crunch recession (see footnote 1 on page 3).CHAPTER 2 17
The lengthy expressions for N2 (K), M1 (K), M2 and L1 (K) are relegated to
Appendix A.
Consider ﬁrst the value of the investment project in the region 0  q < c.
Here demand is that low that production is temporarily suspended. The term
L1 (K)qb1, being increasing in q, stands for the value of the option to start pro-
ducing in the future, which happens once q rises beyond c. This option value
is larger the closer q is to c. The fact that L1 (K) is positive for the considered
parameter ranges is shown in the appendix (see Corollary 1).
The value of the investment project in the region c  q < 2gK + c consists
of three terms where the third term is the cash ﬂow generated by the sales.
The ﬁrst term, which is negative, corrects for the fact that production is con-
strained by the capacity level, where the constraint becomes binding once q
reaches the level 2gK + c. The absolute value of this term increases with q.
The second term, M2qb2, corrects for the fact that the quadratic proﬁt func-
tion is positive even when q falls below the unit production cost c. M1(K) and
M2 are negative for the considered parameter ranges (for the proof see Corol-
lary 1 in the Appendix). We assume that switching between different levels
of production is costless. One of the main goals of the paper is to analyze the
differences of investment in ﬂexible compared to investment in inﬂexible ca-
pacity. Therefore, we want to look at the two extreme cases, i.e. capacity that is
fully ﬂexible in adapting production to demand without any adjustment costs
and production capacity that has to be used up to full extent. In practice ﬁrms
might decide to install an in-between degree of ﬂexibility.
In the region q  2gK + c demand is that large that the ﬁrm produces at
full capacity, which generates a discounted cash ﬂow stream that is reﬂected
in the second and third term of the value of the investment project associated
with this region. The ﬁrst term, N2 (K)qb2, describes the value of the option
that in case demand decreases, in fact q falling below 2gK + c, the ﬁrm is able
to scale down production below capacity and is not forced to keep producing
with full capacity. N2(K) is positive for the considered parameter range (see
Appendix A).
Knowing the value of the project, V(q,K), we are able to derive the op-
timal investment strategy. In general the procedure is as follows. First, we
determine the optimal capacity choice K(q) for a given level of q. Second, we
derive the optimal investment threshold q. For this demand level q it holds
that the ﬁrm is indifferent between investment and waiting with investment.
Investment (waiting) is optimal for a q being larger (lower) than q.
It is easy to understand that investment will not take place when demand18 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY






is that low that the ﬁrm suspends production, i.e. the investment threshold q
will never be such that it falls below c. This is because the ﬁrm will not pro-
duce as long as q < c, so it does not lose anything when it saves on discounted
investment expenses by waiting until q becomes bigger than c. In the other
two q regions investment can take place. Investing while c  q < 2gK + c
means that the ﬁrm leaves some capacity idle right after the investment has
been undertaken, while investing for q  2gK + c implies that the capacity
level is fully used right after the moment of investment. Figure 2.1 visualizes
the three regions.
The following proposition provides equations that implicitly determine the
threshold q and the corresponding capacity level K(q) in each of the two
cases. The optimal investment decision corresponds to the case that provides
the largest value of the investment project.
Proposition 1 Concerning the ﬁrm’s investment policy there are two possibilities:
1. Given that the ﬁrm does not produce up to full capacity right after the invest-
ment moment, the optimal capacity level K(q) is implicitly determined by
M0
1 (K)q   dlKl 1 = 0. (2.11)
The expression for M0
1 (K) is stated by equation (2.72) in Appendix B.1. In
case the obtained K is such that from the resulting production quantity (2.5)
it follows that q is not an interior solution, i.e. in case K  q c
2g , then theCHAPTER 2 19





































l = 0. (2.13)
2. Given that the ﬁrm produces up to full capacity right after the investment mo-
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The expression of N0
2 (K) is given by equation (2.74) in the Appendix. In case
the obtained K does not constitute an interior solution, i.e. in case K > q c
2g ,
























K (q)(K (q)g + c)
r
  d(K (q))
l = 0. (2.16)
Outofthesetwopossibilitiestheﬁrmchoosestheonethatgivesthehighestexpected
value of the project Vﬂex (q,K(q)).
A numerical investigation based on this proposition will be provided in
Section 2.3.
6One can show that given that there exists a threshold q, this threshold is unique. For a
detailed analysis of the two conditions that have to be satisﬁed to prove the uniqueness of the
threshold see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (Appendix 4.B).20 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
2.2.2 Inﬂexible Case
The ﬁrm has to decide about when to undertake the capacity investment, and
it has to determine the capacity size. The difference with the previous section
is that the capacity size ﬁxes the production level, i.e. at each point of time
after the investment the ﬁrm produces up to capacity whenever it is an active
producer. Hence, contrary to the ﬂexible ﬁrm in the previous section, for this
inﬂexible ﬁrm it is not possible to produce another positive quantity than the
capacity level. However, we assume that the inﬂexible ﬁrm still has the sus-
pension option in that it will not produce as soon as demand is such that price
will fall below unit production cost, which implies that
p(K) = q   gK < c ) q = 0. (2.17)
In all other cases it holds that
q = K. (2.18)
The implication for the proﬁt ﬂow is that
p(q,K) =
(
0 for 0  q < gK + c,
(q   gK   c)K for q  gK + c.
(2.19)
Considering the two different regions, familiar steps lead to the following
value of the investment project:
Vinﬂex(q,K) =
(
Q1 (K)qb1 for 0  q < gK + c,
P2 (K)qb2 + K
r aq  
K(Kg+c)
r for q  gK + c,
(2.20)
in which b1 (b2) is the positive (negative) root of the quadratic polynomial
(3.11). The lengthy expressions for P2 (K) and Q1 (K) are relegated to Ap-
pendix A. Both constants, P2 and Q1, are positive. The proof can be found in
the Appendix (see Corollary 2).
In case 0  q < gK + c, the ﬁrm does not produce, but it will start doing so
as soon as q exceeds gK + c. The term in Q1 (K) captures the expected proﬁt
from the option to resume operations in the future. If q  gK +c the ﬁrm pro-
duces at rate K, which generates a discounted cash ﬂow stream represented
by the two last terms of V(q,K). The value of future suspension options, ex-
ercised at the moment that q falls below gK + c, is captured in P2 (K)qb2.
Let us turn to the investment decision that maximizes the project value.
Like with the ﬂexible ﬁrm case, also here it is never optimal to invest while
demand is such that production will be suspended right after the investment
decision. Hence, we only need to consider the case where q  gK + c. AgainCHAPTER 2 21
we start out determining the optimal capacity level for every relevant value
of q, which we denote by K (q). Then we proceed by determining the invest-
ment threshold q. The following proposition presents the implicit equations
that result from this procedure.








  dlKl 1 = 0. (2.21)





















The next section contains a numerical analysis based on this proposition.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Occupation Rate
As we have seen in section 2.1, the ﬂexible ﬁrm can either invest in the second
q region, i.e. q 2 [c,2gK + c), where the ﬁrm sets an upper bound for output
at the moment of investment but does not produce up to full capacity yet, or
invest in the third q region, i.e. q 2 [2gK + c,¥), which means that the ﬁrm
invests in a capacity level that is fully used right at the moment of investment.
Later on it will adapt the production rate to the demand while this maximum
output boundary stays ﬁxed. In the following, we will present two examples
which should illustrate that it might be optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in region
2 as well as region 3, depending on the economic environment it faces. In
case of low uncertainty and a small drift rate of demand the ﬁrm prefers to
invest in region 3, while it has a higher incentive to invest in region 2 when
facing highly uncertain demand. Figure 2.2 shows an example where s = 0.1,
a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1, c = 200, d = 1000, and l = 0.7. Solving equations
(2.11) and (2.14) the optimal capacity choice for the two regions is derived.
After comparing the expected values of the investment project, we con-
clude that it is optimal to invest in the second region at the investment trigger
q = 440.13, provided that the initial q value lies below this q. In partic-
ular, the ﬁrm invests immediately if the current value of q exceeds q, while22 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Figure 2.2: Investment Strategy of an example with the optimal in-
vestment moment laying in region II.
2.A: The optimal capacity K(q) as well as production
quantity q(q) as a function of q. Indicating the optimal
investment threshold q and capacity invested in K(q)
as well as the point qq where demand is high enough to
use full capacity for production.
2.B: The bold dashed line shows the optimal production
output as a function of q after investment.
[Note: Parameter values are s = 0.1, a = 0.02, r = 0.1,
g = 1, c = 200, d = 1000 and l = 0.7]































































q=1384.38 θ*=440.13CHAPTER 2 23
Table 2.1: Investment Strategy with the Occupation Rate ocr =
q(q)/K(q).
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1,
c = 200, l = 0.7 and d = 1000.]
s q K(q) q(q) ocr
0.1 440.13 592.19 120.07 20.3%
0.15 648.17 2819.94 224.08 7.9%
0.2 1769.72 93195.79 784.85 0.8%
otherwise it delays investment until q becomes equal to q. At this demand re-
alization the optimal capacity choice K(q) is 592.19 while production is sig-
niﬁcantly less, q(q) = 120.065. This results in an occupation rate of 20.3%,
implying that at the moment of investment the ﬁrm leaves almost 80% of the
installed capacity idle. Demand would have to rise signiﬁcantly up to the
threshold qq = 1384.38 in order to reach the point where the ﬁrm will produce
up to capacity. After the investment is undertaken, the ﬁrm is producing the
optimal quantity q(q). At the moment that demand reaches qq the ﬁrm faces
the capacity restriction K(q). For q > qq the ﬁrm produces at full capacity.
Choosing a relatively low level of uncertainty (s = 0.03) and a small drift
rate (a = 0.002), the ﬁrm will optimally produce at full capacity already at the
moment of investment. Figure 2.3 illustrates this result. If the initial value for
q is sufﬁciently low, the ﬁrm invests when q reaches the threshold value q =
283.159 for the ﬁrst time. Then the corresponding capacity choice (K(q) =
33.515) is lower than the optimal quantity and therefore, the ﬁrm produces
at full capacity right after the investment, as long as q exceeds qq. Otherwise
production equals q(q).
In Dangl (1999), from which we adopted the parameter values of Figure
2.2, the main result is that the project size is exploding with increasing uncer-
tainty, while on the other hand the project is unlikely to be installed because
the incentive to wait with investment is increasing at the same time. He claims
that the probability that the ﬁrm will invest in the near future vanishes with
increasing uncertainty. This is illustrated in Table 2.1, in which both the capac-
ity and the investment threshold increase more than proportionally with the
volatility of demand.
In addition, Table 1 focuses on the effect of uncertainty on the occupation
rate. The table shows that, while for s = 0.1 the ﬁrm uses 20 percent of the24 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Figure 2.3: Investment Strategy of an example with the optimal in-
vestment moment laying in region III.
3.A: The optimal capacity K(q) as well as production
quantity q(q) as a function of q. Indicating the optimal
investment threshold q and capacity invested in K(q)
as well as the point qq where demand is high enough to
use full capacity for production.
3.B: The bold dashed line shows the optimal production
output as a function of q after investment.
[Note: Parameter values are s = 0.03, a = 0.002, r = 0.1,
g = 1, c = 200, d = 1000 and l = 0.7.]




















































installed capacity at the moment of the investment, the occupation rate de-
creases enormously with uncertainty. For an uncertainty level of s = 0.15, the
rate drops to less than 10 percent (7.95%) and for s = 0.2 the ﬁrms uses just
0.8 percent of the capacity installed at the moment of the investment. The rea-
son why the ﬁrm decides to invest in such a high capacity level relative to the
production level can be explained by, ﬁrst, noting that investment costs are
concave so that installing an additional unit of capacity is cheap when capac-
ity is already large. Second, the low occupation rate is caused by the fact that
the ﬁrm can invest only once. This implies that at one point in time it has to
decide about how much capacity it will have at its disposal forever. Therefore,
it is understandable that the ﬁrm will install a large capacity especially in case
of highly uncertain demand and a positive demand trend.
One might ﬁnd it more realistic to include an upper boundary for the max-
imum capacity that can be installed, since. However, from results of Dangl
(1999) we know that such an additional boundary would not change the re-
sults qualitatively. Dangl ﬁnds, that deﬁning a limit for the capacity, damps
the size of investment for highly volatile demand regions as well as the de-
lay of investment. When volatility in demand exceeds a certain value, the
ﬁrm will install the highest possible amount of capacity available. The effect
of uncertainty on investment timing, i.e. increasing uncertainty increases the
investment threshold, remains unchanged.
2.3.2 Impact of Flexibility
Figure 2.4 shows the impact of ﬂexibility and uncertainty on the investment
strategy. The left panel compares the investment thresholds for the ﬂexible
and inﬂexible model, and the right panel shows the difference in the optimal
capacity choice of the two ﬁrms as a function of uncertainty. The capacity
choice of the ﬂexible ﬁrm is exploding for high uncertainty while the capac-
ity choice of the inﬂexible ﬁrm is lower and also increasing with uncertainty
albeit at a lower rate. The inﬂexible ﬁrm cannot adapt the production level,
so instead it has to produce always up to capacity after the moment of invest-
ment whenever it is an active producer. Therefore, the inﬂexible ﬁrm chooses
for less capacity. Furthermore, we see that the optimal production output at
the moment of the investment of the ﬂexible ﬁrm falls below the capacity level
of the inﬂexible ﬁrm.
The left panel of Figure 2.4 shows that both for the ﬂexible and for the in-
ﬂexible ﬁrm the investment threshold increases in uncertainty. This implies26 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Figure 2.4: Impact of Flexibility and Uncertainty on the Investment
Strategy. 4.A: Optimal Investment Thresholds (q) for the
Flexible and Inﬂexible Firm as a Function of s. 4.B: Opti-
mal Capacity Level (K(q)) and Production Level (q(q))
at the Moment of Investment as a Function of s for the
Flexible and Inﬂexible Firm.
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1,
c = 200, d = 1000 and l = 0.7.]


































that when uncertainty goes up, a higher demand level is needed before it is
optimal to invest. This is partly caused by the fact that in both cases capacity
increases with uncertainty (right panel), and it is partly due to the standard
real options result that in a more uncertain economic environment the ﬁrm
has a higher incentive to wait for more information before undertaking the
investment (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
Comparing the investment thresholds for the ﬂexible and the inﬂexible
ﬁrm, we note that there are two contrary effects. On the one hand the value
of the project is higher for the ﬂexible ﬁrm, which raises the incentive for this
ﬁrm to invest earlier. The higher project value is caused by the ability to adapt
quantity so that it can avoid overproduction in case demand falls. But on the
other hand the inﬂexible ﬁrm invests in a lower capacity level, as shown in
the right panel of Figure 2.4. This implies that the demand can be at a lower
level for the investment of the inﬂexible ﬁrm to take place. This gives the in-
ﬂexible ﬁrm an incentive to invest earlier than the ﬂexible ﬁrm. Since the right
panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the capacity choice of the ﬂexible ﬁrm is explod-
ing, the second effect dominates for high uncertainty and the inﬂexible ﬁrm
invests earlier in this case. For lower levels of uncertainty the higher project
value due to ﬂexibility makes that the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests earlier.
2.4 Robustness
2.4.1 Convex Investment Cost
So far, our analysis is based on the investment cost function, I(K) = dKl,
where the constant l has a value less than one. There are important economic
reasons pleading for such a concavely shaped investment cost function, such
as indivisibilities, use of information, ﬁxed costs of ordering, and quantity
discounts. However, a convexly shaped investment cost function, thus with
l > 1 so that marginal costs are increasing with investment expenditures, can
also be motivated. Consider, for instance, a monopsonistic market of capital
goods. In a monopsony there is only one ﬁrm which demands some factor of
production. Facing an upward sloping supply curve and furthermore aiming
toincreaseitsrateofgrowth, theﬁrmwillbeconfrontedwithincreasingprices
resulting from increased demand of capital goods.
Table 2.2 shows the difference in investment triggers and occupation rate
for a concave cost function (l = 0.7 < 1) and a convex one (l = 1.1 > 1).
Clearly, the ﬁrm decides to invest later in less capacity in the convex case. This28 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Table 2.2: Comparing Investment Strategies with Convex (l < 1) and
Concave (l > 1) Investment Cost Structure. The upper
three lines present the results of a convex cost structure with
l = 0.7. The lower lines show the results assuming a con-
cave cost structure with l = 1.1.
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1,
c = 200 and d = 1000.]
s q K(q) q(q) ocr
0.1 440.13 592.19 120.07 20.3%
0.15 648.17 2819.94 224.08 7.9%
0.2 1769.72 93195.79 784.85 0.8%
0.1 767.90 311.89 283.95 91%
0.15 1390.96 1033.76 595.48 58%
0.2 6240.78 17738.30 3020.39 17%
is an expected result since the investment cost the ﬁrm is facing for the convex
case is signiﬁcantly higher for larger investments (l = 1.1), and therefore
installing a large amount of capacity is more expensive.
The effect of the change in the cost structure on the occupation rate is that,
ﬁrst, the inﬂuence of increasing uncertainty on the occupation rate remains to
be of decreasing behavior, i.e. that higher uncertainty results in a lower rela-
tion between installed and used capacity. Second, for a given uncertainty level
the occupation rate is signiﬁcantly higher for convex investment costs. This
is because installing an additional unit of capacity when capacity is already
large, is signiﬁcantly more expensive in the convex case.
Table 2.3 shows what happens when keeping the assumption of convex in-
vestment cost but increasing the parameter l. For a low level of uncertainty,
i.e. s = 0.05, we get the expected result that the ﬁrm invests later in less capac-
ity when l is higher, because the investment costs are higher. However, at the
uncertainty level of s = 0.1 the ﬁrm facing investment costs with parameter
l = 1.3 is still investing later than the one facing investment costs with param-
eter l = 1.1, but it invests in more capacity even though its investment costs
are higher. This is because the larger threshold level q implies that demand
is higher at the moment of investment. This effect, namely larger capacity
investment while investment costs are higher, is reinforced when uncertaintyCHAPTER 2 29
Table 2.3: Investment Strategy of the Flexible Firm comparing two
Levels of Convex Investment Cost Structure (l = 1.1 is cho-
sen for the upper four lines and l = 1.3 for the lower lines.)
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1,
c = 200 and d = 1000.]
s q K(q) q(q) ocr
0.05 534.73 144.17 167.37 100%
0.1 767.90 311.89 283.95 91%
0.15 1390.96 1033.76 595.48 58%
0.2 6240.78 17738.30 3020.39 17%
0.05 736.63 100.914 268.31 100%
0.1 1260.23 321.833 530.11 100%
0.15 2678.08 1129.39 1239.04 100%
0.2 16674.00 18614.6 8237.02 44.25%
goes up from s = 0.1 onwards.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the inﬂuence of ﬂexibility in production volumes on
the optimal investment decision while the investment cost function is convex.
The right panel shows that the ﬂexible ﬁrm still invests in a larger capacity
level, but that the gap between the optimal capacity choice of the ﬂexible ﬁrm
and the inﬂexible ﬁrm is not so large as for the concave investment cost case.
This is because the convex cost structure makes large investments a lot more
expensive. The implication is that the upperbound on the production volume
for the ﬂexible ﬁrm does not differ a lot from the inﬂexible ﬁrm production
volume. Consequently, under convex investment costs the project value is
more equal for the ﬂexible and inﬂexible ﬁrm. This means that the two con-
trary effects on investment timing, i.e. the ﬂexible ﬁrm invests later because
of larger capacity and earlier because of a higher project value, are not so big.
Overall, in this particular example the “capacity effect” dominates, i.e. the
ﬂexible ﬁrm invests later, as shown in the left panel of Figure 2.5.
In case of low uncertainty, the difference between optimal investment in
ﬂexible and inﬂexible capacity is very small. This is not the case for the re-
sults of concave investment costs (see Figure 2.4). In the scale of Figure 2.5 the
thresholds for both cases might appear to be very close to each other. How-
ever, numerically the investment threshold for ﬂexible investment is slightly30 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Figure 2.5: Impact of Flexibility and Uncertainty on the Investment
Strategy for Convex Investment Cost. 5.A: Optimal Invest-
ment Thresholds (q) for the Flexible and Inﬂexible Firm as
a Function of s. 5.B: Optimal Capacity Level (K(q)) and
Production Level (q(q)) at the Moment of Investment as
a Function of s for the Flexible and Inﬂexible Firm.

































[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 1, c = 200, d = 1000 and l = 1.1.]CHAPTER 2 31
larger than the threshold for inﬂexible investment. Since uncertainty is low
and investment costs are higher than for the concave case, the ﬁrm invests in
region III, i.e. it installs capacity and uses it up to the full extent at the moment
of investment. Investment costs are too high and expectations of demand too
low for the ﬁrm to have an incentive to install additional capacity that could
potentially be used in case demand increases in the future.
2.4.2 Iso-elastic Inverse Demand Function
This section studies to what extent the assumption of linear demand was deci-




t with 0 < g < 1, (2.23)
where fqtg behaves according to expression (3.3).
Flexible Model









A remarkable feature is that this results in a constant price p(q) = c
1 g,
which is thus independent from the stochastic process fqtg. Note that this
price always exceeds unit production cost c. This makes that, while for the
linearcasetheoptimalquantitycanfalltozeromakingitnecessarytotakeinto
account the possibility of temporary suspension, for the iso-elastic demand
function the optimal quantity produced is always positive. This implies that
after the investment is undertaken, the ﬁrm will produce forever while the
production rate will be adapted to the realization of the demand process at
every instant.





M1 (K)qb1 + L 1
r ea 1






N2 (K)qb2 + K1 g








where e = 1
g and the (lengthy) expressions for M1, L and N2 are presented in
Appendix A.32 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
The ﬁrst line is the project value when the ﬁrm is currently not producing
at full capacity. where the second term is the expected discounted cash ﬂow







ative) ﬁrst term corrects this cash ﬂow stream for the presence of the capacity
constraint.
Thesecondlineistheprojectvalueatthemomentthattheﬁrmisproducing
at full capacity, where the last two terms stand for the expected discounted
cash ﬂow stream when the ﬁrm’s production level is equal to the capacity
size K. The ﬁrst term is the value of the option to produce below capacity
level, which takes place when demand falls with such an amount that it is not
possible anymore for the ﬁrm to sell a quantity K against a price of c
1 g.
The following proposition presents the optimal investment decision.
Proposition 3 Concerning the ﬁrm’s investment policy there are two possibilities:
1. Given that the ﬁrm does not produce up to full capacity right after the invest-
ment moment, the optimal capacity level K(q) is implicitly determined by
M0
1(K)qb1   dlKl 1 = 0. (2.26)
In case the obtained K is such that from the resulting production quantity
























The investment threshold q satisﬁes






2. Given that the ﬁrm produces up to full capacity right after the investment mo-








  dlKl 1 = 0. (2.29)
























The investment threshold q is implicitly determined by









l = 0. (2.31)
Outofthesetwopossibilitiestheﬁrmchoosestheonethatgivesthehighestexpected
value of the project V (q,K(q)).
Inﬂexible Model
The inﬂexible ﬁrm produces up to full capacity K forever. Consequently (cf.








The following proposition presents the optimal investment decision of the in-
ﬂexible ﬁrm.







  dlKl 1 = 0. (2.33)














The optimal investment decision of the ﬂexible ﬁrm is presented in Table 2.4.
The table shows that the occupation rate is decreasing with increasing uncer-
tainty. For lower uncertainty levels (s = 0   0.3) the ﬁrm produces up to ca-
pacity at the moment of investment. For higher uncertainty levels it decides to
install a higher capacity level than it uses at the moment of investment, where
the occupation rate decreases with uncertainty. These results are qualitatively
similar to what we obtained for our basic framework.34 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Table 2.4: Investment Strategy of the Flexible Firm.
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 0.7,
c = 5, l = 0.7 and d = 100.]
s q K(q) q(q) ocr
0.1 18.85 1.192 1.192 100%
0.2 36.83 3.105 3.105 100%
0.3 69.65 7.713 7.713 100%
0.39 127.94 19.223 18.387 95.65%
0.4 289.28 98.093 58.974 60.12%
0.41 828.40 810.996 265.106 32.69%
0.42 3361.74 13660.900 1960.870 14.35%
Table 2.5 depicts the investment decision of the inﬂexible ﬁrm. The very
low capacity choice is striking. Since the inﬂexible ﬁrm has to produce up to
capacity without the possibility to reduce production, it has to keep capacity
low compared to the ﬂexible ﬁrm, which especially holds when uncertainty is
high.
As to the timing, previously we detected that on the one hand the inﬂexible
ﬁrm has an incentive to invest later, because inﬂexibility in the production
decision leads to a lower project value. On the other hand the inﬂexible ﬁrm
has an incentive to invest earlier because the lower capacity level does not
require a high current demand level for the investment to take place. Since
capacity is so much lower here for the inﬂexible ﬁrm, it makes sense that the
latter effect dominates so that the inﬂexible ﬁrm will invest earlier.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper considers the timing and capacity choice of a ﬁrm facing stochas-
tic demand. We distinguish between a ﬂexible scenario, where the ﬁrm can
continuously adjust production over time, and an inﬂexible scenario, where
the ﬁrm always has to produce up to capacity. In both cases the ﬁrm has the
option to suspend production, which could occur when demand is too low.
Hence, the ﬁrm makes three decisions: choice of investment time, choice of
capacity, and choice of production quantity. With respect to the last decision
it holds that, where the ﬂexible ﬁrm can choose any production quantity fromCHAPTER 2 35
Table 2.5: Investment Strategy of the Inﬂexible Firm.
[Note: Parameter values are a = 0.02, r = 0.1, g = 0.7, c = 5
and d = 100.]
l s q K(q)
0.7 0.1 18.31 0.3372
0.7 0.2 20.77 0.4328
0.7 0.3 23.85 0.5676
0.7 0.4 27.76 0.7617
0.7 0.45 30.17 0.8937
zero to the capacity level, the inﬂexible ﬁrm can only choose between produc-
ing at full capacity or refraining from producing. Concerning the timing and
capacity decision we develop implicit solutions, which we investigate numer-
ically. We show that the ﬁrm invests later in more capacity if demand un-
certainty rises. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that being able to vary production over
time implies that the ﬂexible ﬁrm wants to install a larger capacity than the
inﬂexible ﬁrm. This capacity difference goes up with uncertainty. This has a
side-effect in that for the ﬂexible ﬁrm right after the investment the occupa-
tion rate, i.e. the part of the capacity that is used for production, falls with
uncertainty. Comparing the optimal investment timing of the ﬂexible and the
inﬂexible ﬁrm, we ﬁnd that two contrary effects prevail. First, the ﬂexible ﬁrm
has an incentive to invest earlier because being able to vary the production
quantity raises the value of the investment project. On the other hand, the fact
thattheﬂexibleﬁrmwantstoinstallalargercapacitydemandsalargercurrent
demand level for an investment to be optimal, which in turn implies that this
gives the ﬂexible ﬁrm an incentive to invest later. The latter effect dominates
in a highly uncertain economic environment. Hence, when demand is highly
uncertain, increased ﬂexibility in production further delays investment.
Ourresultsleadtoseveralhypothesisthatcouldbetestedempirically. Namely,
high uncertainty in combination with ﬂexibility should lead to later and larger
investments, andlowinitialoccupationrates. Lowuncertaintyincombination
with ﬂexibility should lead to early investments.
Our results come with several limitations. In our work ﬁrms can invest
only once, as is mainly done in the real options literature. Further, with re-
gard to ﬂexibility we only focus on volume ﬂexibility, and not on, for example,
product ﬂexibility. Also, we disregard competition. In particular, extending36 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
our monopoly to a duopoly model in a continuous time setting promises in-
teresting insights. Furthermore, we assume that holding capacity is costless.
Introducing ﬁxed cost for the maintenance of installed capacity in the model
constitutes an interesting step for future research.CHAPTER 2 37
2.A Appendix
Additional Model Details and Results
Flexible Model








  rV(q) + p(q) = 0. (2.34)
We solve this differential equation for V, where the non-homogeneous part is
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L1qb1 + L2qb2 for 0  q < c,








for c  q < 2gK + c,
N1qb1 + N2qb2 + K
r aq  
K(Kg+c)
r for q  2gK + c.
(2.35)
Next, we derive L1, L2, M1, M2, N1 and N2 in (2.35). Following Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) (see Section 6.2), we solve the differential equation separately
for the different regions and stitch together the two solutions at the points
(q = q1) and (q = q2). From the boundary conditions










we derive that the parameters L2 and N1 in (2.35) are equal to zero. The other


























































































































































r   2a   s2(b   2)  
2cq2
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It holds that G(b) = 1
4gq2











































Corollary 1 The following holds for the parameters L1, M1, M2 and L2 within the
considered parameter ranges:
M1 < 0, (2.51)CHAPTER 2 39
M2 < 0, (2.52)
L1 > 0, (2.53)
N2 > 0. (2.54)
Proof of Corollary 1 Considering the parameters M1 and M2 we know that
the left part in the expression (2.47) as well as in expression (2.48) is positive
since b1 > 0 and b2 < 0 hold. Therefore, it remains to show that the follow-
ing holds: F(b1) < 0 and F(b2) > 0. Rewriting the function F(.) one can
easily see that it is linear with a negative slope, crossing the horizontal line
in b0 =
2r(a+s2)
2a2+s2(r+a) > 0. Since b2 < 0 we can conclude that F(b2) is strictly
positive. And if b1 > b0 holds then F(b1) < 0. In order to verify that b1 > b0
holds, we consider the quadratic equation (3.11) and derive the value of the
function Q(.) at b0. This is given by Q(b0) =  
(r m)rs4(2m r+s2)
(2m2+(r+m)s2)2 < 0. Since
the quadratic function Q(b) is an upward pointing parabola that goes to ¥ as
b goes to ¥ we can infer from Q(b0) < 0 that the point b0 has to be less than
b1. Considering the parameter L1 it holds that
c(2 b1)   (2gK + c)(2 b1) > 0, (2.55)
since b1 > 2. This and the fact that F(b2) > 0 is sufﬁcient to proof that L1 > 0.
Considering that F(b1) < 0 and that the very left part in the expression of N2
is negative one can conclude that N2 is positive.
Inﬂexible Model
























































with q3 = gK + c.
Corollary 2 Both parameters P2 and Q1 are positive within the considered param-
eter ranges.40 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
Proof of Corollary 2 In order to show that both parameters, P2 and Q1, are
positive, we need
r > ab1 and r > ab2. (2.60)
To verify these, we evaluate the quadratic polynomial Q(b) = 1
2s2b(b   1) +











Q(b) is an upward pointing parabola that goes to ¥ as b goes to ¥. (For
moredetailsaboutthequadraticequationseeDixitandPindyck(1994).) There-
fore, r
a must lie to the right of the larger root b1. It obviously does not lie to
the left of the smaller root b2 because it is strictly positive according to the
assumption r > a.
Expected project value










[V(q,K(q))   I(K)], (2.62)
where T is the (random) ﬁrst time when the stochastic process qt reaches q
starting at q0. The calculation of E

e rT
can be found in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
Iso-elastic Inverse Demand Function - Flexible Model






































  rV(q) + p(q) = 0. (2.64)
Solving equation (2.64) gives the value of the project (2.25). The parameters








































where ˆ q = cKg
1 g.
Proof of Proposition 1
The procedure of this proof is split into two steps. First, the optimal invest-
ment capacity is determined for a given level of q. This optimal capacity level
K is determined by maximizing the objective value of the project. We have to
calculate the optimal capacity level for region 2 and 3, respectively. We denote
V(q,K) = Vi(q,K) for region i, (2.68)
where region 2 denotes q1  q < q2 and region 3 is deﬁned by q  q2.
Setting the marginal value of the project equal to the marginal investment
costs yields the equations (2.11) and (2.14), which the optimal capacity choice








































In order to verify that the derived K(q)s are maxima for their respective
region, the second order derivatives are calculated and proved to be less than
zero at the derived optimal capacity.
For certain choices of the parameters, it may happen that equations (2.11) or
(2.14) do not have an admissible solution, meaning that the function Vi(q,K) 
I(K)) is monotonic in K in region 2 or 3. If this is the case, then we may have
an increasing or a decreasing behavior in K. On the other side, if equations
(2.11) or (2.14) have an admissible solution, then it means that the function
[Vi(q,K)   I(K))] is concave in that region, and therefore has a local maxi-
mum. Thus, onehastotakeintoaccountthelocalbehaviorof[Vi(q,K)   I(K))],
in the case that it is monotonic. If we are in region 2, we can rule out the de-
creasing case, because it means that the optimal capacity level K is zero, and
thus there is no production at all. Therefore, if [V2(q,K)   I(K))] is increasing
in K, one should take the maximum allowed capacity level for this region, i.e.
q c
2g . Similarly, if we are in region 3, one should rule out the increasing case
because it would mean that optimally an inﬁnite capacity level should be cho-
sen. In the decreasing case, one should choose the minimum allowed capacity
for this region, which is q c
2g .
We are able to ﬁnd solutions of equations (2.11) and (2.14) numerically for
different values of q.
Knowing the optimal investment region and capacity level, the optimal
timing strategy can be derived. With the following value of the option
F(q) = A1qb1, (2.75)
the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions are (cf. Dixit and Pindyck
(1994))








Substituting (2.77) into equation (2.76) gives



















































for region 3, respectively. Substituting these results into (2.78) leads to the
threshold equations (2.13) and (2.16).
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Here we just have to
derive the optimal capacity choice and investment trigger in the q region,
where q  q3. The value of P0

























Proof of Proposition 3
The concept of the proof is the same as the one for the proof of Proposition 1




1(K) in equations (2.26) and (2.29) are equal to
M0
















, (2.83)44 PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY
N0



















Proof of Proposition 4
The concept is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR
PRODUCT-FLEXIBLE AND DEDICATED PRODUCTION
SYSTEMS UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY1
This paper studies the optimal investment strategy of a ﬁrm having the man-
agerial freedom to acquire either ﬂexible or dedicated production capacity.
Flexible capacity is more expensive but allows the ﬁrm to switch costlessly
between products and handle changes in relative volumes among products in
a given product mix. Dedicated capacities restrict to manufacture one speciﬁc
product but for lower acquisition costs. Speciﬁcally, I model the investment
decision of a monopolist selling two products in a market characterized by
price-dependent and uncertain demand, in a continuous time setting.
I ﬁnd that ﬂexibility especially pays off when uncertainty is high, substi-
tutability low, and proﬁt levels of the two products are substantially different.
In the ﬂexible case, the ﬁrm just produces the most proﬁtable product un-
der high demand, while if demand is low the ﬁrm produces both products to
make total market demand bigger. In the dedicated case the ﬁrm invests in
both capacities only if the substitutability rate is low and proﬁtability of both
products high enough. Otherwise, it restricts investment to one dedicated ca-
pacity for the more proﬁtable product.
Considering a ﬁrm’s decision to change from dedicated to ﬂexible capacity,
it is shown that despite perfectly positively correlated demand the ﬁrm will
1This chapter is based on Hagspiel (2011).
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undertakethisswitchevenforverylowdemandcasesiftheproﬁtabilityofthe
products is substantially different. The option to increase total capacity accel-
erates investment in ﬂexible capacity when the proﬁt levels of both products
are high enough.
3.1 Introduction
Flexibility in manufacturing operations is becoming increasingly more impor-
tant to industrial ﬁrms. Increasing market demand volatility, internationaliza-
tion of markets and competition, as well as shorter product life cycles pose
new challenges for companies. Since the investment cost in ﬂexible capacity
mostly exceeds the investment cost of dedicated capacity, ﬁrms need to know
how much this ﬂexibility is worth for them. This work focuses on the effect
of demand volatility as well as product combination on the ﬁrm’s investment
decisions and the value of product ﬂexibility, which is considered one of the
most (if not the most) strategically important ﬂexibility types (see for example
Goyal and Netessine (2007), Jordan and Graves (1995)).
The automotive industry is a good example of an industry where manufac-
turers’ decisions on investing in production capacity and on the optimal level
of ﬂexibility are critical. On the one hand, expanding already installed capac-
ity is very expensive (Andreou (1990)) and, therefore, the installed capacity
must be sufﬁcient for the whole life cycle of the product and easily adaptable
to new product lines. On the other hand, the proﬁtability of the products are
threatened by low utilization of capacity as well as under-capacity. Japanese
carmakers very early implemented the concept of ﬂexibility, which gave them
a signiﬁcant advantage to their US and European competitors that tradition-
ally built plants that were dedicated to producing a single car model. Later,
also the European and American car industry started to activate in terms of
ﬂexibility. The BMW group for example recently advertised that a new pro-
duction factory in Leipzig added new production capacity with a high level of
ﬂexibility2. Despite this recent approach of European and US car manufactur-
ers to strive for more manufacturing ﬂexibility, Japanese companies still lead
2The BMW groups states that the production program includes not just the full range of
cars of the BMW 1 Series (three-door, Coupé and Convertible) but also the BMW X1. At the
Volkswagen plant in Zwickau (Germany) Passat and Golf run off the same assembly line.
Additional to the ﬂexibility of the assembly line also the supply to the production line is fully
ﬂexible. This allows to change between the models and different interior equipment without
any adaption costs neither time lags. See http://www.bmwgroup.com/d/nav/index.html?CHAPTER 3 47
in this aspect, which is according to Goyal et al. (2006) “an advantage that is
at least partially responsible for the increasing market share of the Japanese
carmakers”.
The investment in and management of ﬂexible capacity has received signif-
icant attention in the operations management literature. While early research
in this ﬁeld has focused on scenarios with exogenously given prices and static
time models, recent papers extend this approach including responsive pric-
ing and multi-stage decision problems. These multi-stage decision models are
built up in the structure of: ﬁrst invest in capacity, then receive additional
information and ﬁnally exploit capacity optimally according to revealed in-
formation. While this structure shows a characteristic of real option models,
the models are restricted to one-period models not taking into account tim-
ing. This work applies a continuous time setting as done in the real options
literature, which allows to gain insight in the optimal timing of the ﬁrm’s in-
vestment decision. The theory of real options explored ﬂexibility mainly as it
is related to the timing structure of capacity acquisition and did not deal with
technologies that exhibit ﬂexibility per se. This work presents a model which
takes into account both aspects: ﬂexibility in timing and investment in ﬂexible
capacity.
Speciﬁcally, this paper studies the investment decision of a monopolist hav-
ingthemanagerialfreedomtoacquireeitherﬂexibleordedicatedmanufactur-
ing capacity, in a continuous time setting. Flexible capacity allows the ﬁrm to
manufacture all of its products with the same production facility while dedi-
cated capacity restricts to one product. Since product ﬂexibility has not been
clearly deﬁned in the literature, for the purpose of this study product ﬂexi-
bility is deﬁned as a system’s ability to switch costlessly between products,
and handle changes in relative volumes among products. Products differ in
substitutability and proﬁtability in the market. The ﬁrm wants to protect ef-
ﬁciently against uncertainty in demand for all of its products. It can choose
the timing as well as the quantity of the investment and is free to invest in
ﬂexible or dedicated production capacity, choosing the one that leads to the
highest expected proﬁt. In a further step I change the assumptions about the
initial conditions of the ﬁrm assuming that it has already entered the market in
an earlier stage and is currently producing with dedicated capacity. The ﬁrm
has the possibility to undertake an investment in order to switch to ﬂexible
capacity.
I analyze the results with a speciﬁc focus on four cases of product combi-
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the ﬁrm’s investment decision. The four cases differ regarding proﬁtability
and substitutability rate between the products: (1) The ﬁrst case considers a
product combination of two almost similarly proﬁtable products with a low
substitutability rate. The car models Passat and Golf of Volkswagen are an
example for such a product combination. In the Volkswagen plant in Mosel
these two car models are produced at an assembly line that is fully ﬂexible
in switching between the two models without adaption time lags or costs.
(2) National-brand manufacturers that, additionally to their brand product,
also produce private label products, are an example for ﬁrms that produce
two highly substitutable products for the same market where one product
(their own manufacturer brand) is more proﬁtable for them than the second
product that is sold to and brought on the market by a private label retailer.
Danone, the famous French food-products corporation for example, produces
a variation of their popular cream cheese dessert “Fruchtzwerge” also for the
private label product “Desira” of Germany’s biggest discounter Aldi3. (3) The
third case depicts the scenario of a ﬁrm producing two products for the same
market that are almost equally proﬁtable and highly substitutable. For brand
manufacturers with less successful national brands, so called B and C brands,
the production of private labels can be almost as proﬁtable as producing their
own brand product. Concorp group, a Dutch confectionery company for ex-
ample states publicly that they do produce for dual branding4. (4) The fourth
case considers a ﬁrm selling two products with a low substitutability rate and
a substantial difference in proﬁtability, in the same market. As an example
think of a technology company producing a newly established touch screen
mobile and a less successful obsolescent model in the same production facil-
ity.
This work focuses on the effect of demand variability - a key driver of ﬂex-
ibility - together with substitutability and product proﬁtability effects. I show
that in the ﬂexible case, under high demand the ﬁrm just produces the most
proﬁtable product, if demand is low the ﬁrm produces both products to make
total demand bigger. Comparing the optimal ﬂexible investment strategies
for the previously mentioned cases, the ﬁrm selling two products with a low
3See on p. 39 in ’Aldi - Welche Marke Steckt Dahinter? 100 Aldi-Top-Artikel und Ihre
Prominenten Hersteller.’ Muenchen: Suedwest Verlag by Schneider, Martina.
4Concorp group states on its website that they “...build brands and deliver pri-
vate label concepts with added value in all segments of selected national and in-
ternational confectionery markets.” Concorp group produces candy foam and boiled
sweets for three different brand names in its production site in Waddinxveen. See
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substitutability rate and high proﬁtability difference invests in signiﬁcantly
higher capacity. Capacity size is growing more than proportionally with the
uncertaintylevel. Thisconﬁrmstheintuitionthataﬁrmproducingtwoalmost
equally proﬁtable products with a low substitutability rate proﬁts the most by
the down size potential to increase the market size by producing both prod-
ucts. In the dedicated case the ﬁrm invests in both capacities if substitutability
rate is low and proﬁtability of both products high enough. In all other cases
the ﬁrm decides to ignore demand for one product in the market and installs
one dedicated capacity for the more proﬁtable product. In this case the ﬁrm
can just gain from the downside potential when demand levels are very low
and therefore the negative effect of restriction to produce up to full capacity
once it has installed capacity for both products, is dominating. For both ded-
icated and ﬂexible capacity investment, I show that the ﬁrm invests later in
higher capacity if demand uncertainty increases. This result is also obtained
forproductionﬂexiblecapacityinvestmentbyHagspieletal.(2011)andDangl
(1999).
In order to study the value of ﬂexibility, I consider as a benchmark the situ-
ation in which a ﬁrm relies on maximally two dedicated capacities rather than
on one ﬂexible capacity. Flexibility especially pays off when uncertainty is
high, substitutability low, and proﬁt levels between the two products are sub-
stantially different. In this case the ﬂexible ﬁrm has the possibility to increase
its total market demand if demand falls low by including the production of
the less proﬁtable second product. The dedicated ﬁrm on the other hand relin-
quishes production of one product completely by acquiring just one dedicated
capacity for the more proﬁtable product.
Since ﬁrms are often not facing the direct choice between dedicated and
ﬂexible capacity, but need to evaluate whether or not to invest in ﬂexible ca-
pacity while currently producing with dedicated once, I additionally analyze
this scenario. This study shows that despite the assumption of perfectly pos-
itively correlated product demand, the ﬁrm undertakes investment to switch
to ﬂexible capacity also for low demand if the proﬁtability of the products is
substantially different. I conclude that the speciﬁc product combination has
a crucial effect on the investment decision. Therefore, ﬁrms should take into
account, besides demand volatility and correlation, the speciﬁc product com-
bination when deciding between dedicated and ﬂexible capacity. This contra-
dicts early literature claiming that ﬂexibility has no value in case of perfectly
correlated demand and conﬁrms more recent literature that claims that ﬂexi-
bility has value also in case of perfectly positively correlated demand. I extend50 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
this approach by analyzing the effect of speciﬁc product combinations on the
value of ﬂexibility.
As already mentioned earlier, there are two streams of literature that are
most relevant to this study: the ﬁrst considers the issue of product ﬂexibility
from an operations management perspective, while the second studies capital
budgeting decision applying real options theory. Both will now be discussed
more extensively.
The issue of resource. ﬂexibility has become a signiﬁcant interest in the op-
erations management community in the beginning of the nineties, following
the increasing viability of ﬂexible, computer-controlled manufacturing sys-
tems. From the operations management literature this work is closely re-
lated to a stream of papers about resource ﬂexibility initiated by work of
Fine and Freund (1990). Fine and Freud derive necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for the acquisition of ﬂexible capacity that are based on a two-stage
convex quadratic program. In the ﬁrst stage a technology investment decision
is made. After observing demand realization, an optimal production deci-
sion is made at the second stage. Inspired by Fine and Freud, Van Mieghem
and Dada (1999) present closely related work that disproves Fine and Freud’s
claim that ﬂexible capacity would not provide additional value when product
demands are perfectly positively correlated. They show that in addition to
its adaptability to demand mix changes, product-ﬂexible technology provides
another opportunity for revenue improvement through its ability to exploit
differentials in price (margin) mix. They argue that product ﬂexibility gen-
erates an option to produce and sell more of highly proﬁtable products at the
expense of less proﬁtable products and show that this option can remain valu-
able even with perfectly positively correlated product demand. I extend this
claim of Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) by analyzing speciﬁc differences in
product combinations and analyze its individual effects on the value of ﬂexi-
bility.
Most closely related to my work are two recently published papers of Chod
andRudi(2005)andBishandWang(2004), whostudytheresourceinvestment
decision of a two-product, price setting ﬁrm that operates in a monopolistic
setting. Chod and Rudi look at the effect of demand variability and demand
correlation on the optimal ﬂexible resource investment decision and show that
expected proﬁt is increasing in variability and decreasing in the correlation of
normally distributed demand. Bish and Wang’s model is more general than
the one of Chod and Rudi by allowing the ﬁrm to invest in ﬂexible and ded-
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Both previously mentioned papers present two-stage models that allow them
to gain insight in the optimal resource size and allocation but deprives the
timing aspect of investment decisions. Unlike these papers, I focus on an eco-
nomic environment where uncertainty in demand of two products arises from
one single market. Optimizing investment decisions facing uncertainty about
the general economic situation became even more appealing for industry that
just recently witnessed one of the biggest economic crises in history. The credit
crunch affected the whole global market and companies faced large drops in
demand for their products.
Applying a continuous time setting allows me to gain insight in the optimal
timing of the ﬁrm’s investment strategy. For evaluating investment decisions
that have the following three characteristics: (1) the investment considered
is irreversible, (2) there is uncertainty about future rewards and (3) a leeway
about timing of investment, the theory of real options is used to evaluate such
investment decisions. But real options theory explores ﬂexibility mainly as it
is related to the timing structure of capacity or information acquisition or com-
mitment of resources: that means that the ﬁrm loses ﬂexibility when it makes
an irreversible commitment. Most papers do not deal with technologies that
exhibit ﬂexibility per se. Now that more and more ﬁrms undergo investment
in ﬂexible capacity because it appears for them to be a necessary tool to hedge
against highly volatile demand, it is important to develop these models fur-
ther with a special attention to include the ability of ﬂexible capacity. This
paper aims to take a crucial step in this direction. I explicitly consider the use
of a (product-) ﬂexible technology.
Real option papers that deal with investments in ﬂexible capacity, mainly
take into account capacity that allows to switch between different inputs or
different outputs. With regard to product ﬂexibility this would mean that a
system is able to switch from producing product 1 to producing product 2
and backwards if the production of product 1 is becoming more proﬁtable
again. In contrast to these models, I take into account a system that is ﬂex-
ible in adapting the relative volume between two products, i.e. it can use
total capacity to produce x units of one product and y units of the other and
continuously adapt this split over time. Early approaches in evaluating such
switching options have been presented by McDonald and Siegel (1986), Ku-
latilaka (1988) and Triantis and Hodder (1990). Conceptually, the switch be-
tween two volatile assets or commodities can be modelled as an exchange
option. Margrabe (1978) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) model European ﬁ-
nite and American perpetual exchange options, respectively, which are linear52 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
homogeneous in the underlying stochastic variables.
TriantisandHodderevaluateproduct(-mix)ﬂexibilitybasedonoptionprin-
ciples. Kulatilaka applies option pricing principles to the same problem using
a stochastic dynamic programming formulation that includes costly switch-
ing between modes of operation. Andreou (1990) published a more applied
study associated with the General Motors Research Laboratories that focuses
on the economic evaluation of product ﬂexibility. He presents a ﬁnancial
model for calculating the dollar value of ﬂexible plant capacity for two prod-
uctsunderconditionsofuncertainmarketdemand. InrecentworkDockendor
and Paxson (2011) present a two-factor model with continuous switching op-
portunities between two commodity outputs, taking into account operating,
switching costs and the possibility of suspension of operation. Adkins and
Paxson (011a) evaluate input switching options for single as well as multiple
switching. Both papers present quasi-analytical solutions for two-factor mod-
els. Other current papers that deal with options to switch between inputs,
outputs or between inputs and output are, for example, Adkins and Paxson
(011b), Sigbjorn et al. (2008) and Bastian-Pinto et al. (2009). These papers do
evaluate investment in ﬂexible technology based on option theory, but do not
include the timing decision nor capacity choice.
This work was inspired by the increasing interest in the development of the
realoptionstheoryregardingtechnologicalﬂexibilityshownbytheoperations
and production management sector. Bengtsson (2001) presented a work that
relates the real options literature to manufacturing ﬂexibility from an indus-
trial engineering/production management perspective. He refers to product
ﬂexibility as one of the ﬂexibility types that have not been treated as real op-
tions yet. While his work addresses a wide range of manufacturing ﬂexibility,
Bengtsson and Olhager (2002) use real options theory to evaluate one speciﬁc
type, i.e. product-mix ﬂexibility, in a real case analysis. Their main focus is on
solving for the value of a production system with multiple products which is
applied to real case data, while the timing or capacity size decisions are not
considered. Furthermore, there is an increasing number of real data cases and
empirical analysis in this area. Two recent papers are for example Goyal et al.
(2006) and Fleischmann et al. (2006). Both focus on the automotive industry.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the general
model and solves the optimization problems for the ﬂexible capacity and ded-
icated capacity case. The optimal investment triggers for size and time of
investment are derived. The ﬁrst part of Section 3.3 analyzes the capacity and
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timing and size are affected by demand uncertainty. The second part concen-
trates on analyzing investment in dedicated production capacity. Section 3.4
studies the optimal investment strategy of a ﬁrm having the option to choose
between ﬂexible and dedicated capacity investment and quantiﬁes the value
of ﬂexibility. In Section 3.5 the optimal investment in ﬂexible capacity is stud-
ied assuming that the ﬁrm is currently using dedicated capacities. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Model
Consider a ﬁrm that produces two products, indicated by product A and B.
The ﬁrm has to decide about the optimal capacity investment. This involves
three decisions: when to invest, the size of the capacity and in which type of
capacity to invest. The ﬁrm can invest in maximal two dedicated capacities,
each of which can produce only one product, or in a more expensive, ﬂexible
production capacity, which can produce both products.
The ﬁrm is uncertain about future demand where the inverse demand func-
tion are assumed to be linear. The inverse demand functions for the two prod-
ucts are given by
pA(qt,qA,qB) = qt   qA   gqB, (3.1)
pB(qt,qB,qA) = aqt   qB   gqA, (3.2)
where the demand intercept q follows the geometric Brownian motion
dqt = mqtdt + sqtdWt. (3.3)
In this expression m is a constant representing the trend, s is the uncertainty
parameter and dWt is the increment of a Wiener process implying that it is
independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance dt. I often
refer to the uncertainty in demand intercepts simply as “demand uncertainty”
in this paper. g 2 ( 1,1) is the product substitutability parameter, and g > 0
(g < 0) signiﬁes that the products are substitutes (complements). Since prod-
ucts made by the same ﬂexible resource tend not to be complements, most
applications are characterized by a nonnegative g. Therefore, this work will
focuses on the case of the products being substitutes. The two products are as-
sumed to be sold in the same market. Product A is the more proﬁtable product
in this market, i.e. a < 1. a 2 (0,1) is referred to as the proﬁtability parameter
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(qt,B). From now on I drop the time subscript whenever there can be no mis-
understanding. For simplicity variable production costs are not considered
yet. It follows that the proﬁt ﬂow is deﬁned by
P(q) = max
qA,qB
[pAqA + pBqB]. (3.4)
Total production output, i.e. q = qA + qB, is restricted to be up to full capacity.
This means that after investment the ﬁrm always produces up to full capacity,
a constraint also referred to as capacity clearance. Two aspects motivate the
introduction of this assumption here. First, it allows to concentrate on the ef-
fect of one speciﬁc type of technological ﬂexibility, i.e. product-ﬂexibility, in
the analysis. Releasing this assumption and therefore allow the ﬁrm to pro-
duce under capacity, would mean to include the effect of production ﬂexibility
to the problem. See Anupindi and Jiang (2008) and Hagspiel et al. (2011) for
examples of papers that consider investment in production ﬂexible capacity.
Second, producing below capacity is often linked with large ﬁxed costs associ-
ated with, for example, labor and production ramp-up. Therefore, in practice
ﬁrms often reduce prices to keep production lines running. See Goyal and
Netessine (2007) and Chod and Rudi (2005) for examples of similar assump-
tions.
The ﬂexible capacity is denoted by KF and the dedicated capacities by KDA
and KDB, respectively. The investment cost are sunk and assumed to be linear
(forthesameassumptionseeforexample, FineandFreund(1990), VanMieghem
and Dada (1999) and Chod and Rudi (2005)). Let ci denote the unit cost of in-
vesting in resource Ki, i = F,DA,DB.
3.2.1 Flexible Capacity
Consider a ﬁrm that has to decide about investment in ﬂexible capacity. Flexi-
ble capacity allows it to produce both products, A and B, on the same produc-
tion line. It decides about the optimal time to invest and the optimal capacity
size invested in, considering that it has to produce always up to full capacity
after the moment of investment. The optimal output rate for the two products
q
A and q
B, respectively, is determined by maximizing the proﬁt ﬂow consider-
ing the capacity clearance constraint (qA + qB = KF) and the upper and lower







2 for q < ˆ q,









2 for q < ˆ q,
0 for q  ˆ q,
(3.6)
where ˆ q denotes the boundary
2(1 g)
(1 a) KF. For low demand, q 2 [0, ˆ q), the ﬁrm
will produce both products. If demand increases, i.e. q 2 [ˆ q,¥), the ﬁrm will
switch to use full capacity KF for production of the more proﬁtable product A
and suspend production of product B. Expressions (3.5) and (3.6) imply that









F for q < ˆ q,
(q   KF)KF for q  ˆ q.
(3.7)
In order to ﬁnd the value of this investment project, the dynamic program-
ming approach is applied. The value function, denoted here by V(q,KF), must
satisfy the Bellman equation





where r is the (constant) discount rate. Applying Ito’s Lemma, substituting








  rV + P(q) = 0. (3.9)
Solving this equation for V(q,K), considering that we have two different re-
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2(r m) and a3 =  
(1+g)
2r . b1 (b2) is the positive
(negative) root of the quadratic polynomial
1
2
s2b2 + (m  
1
2
s2)b   r = 0. (3.11)
V(q) must be continuously differentiable across the boundary ˆ q =
2(1 g)
(1 a) KF.
Using the fact that V(q,KF) must be continuously differentiable across the











































Corollary 1 in Appendix A shows that A1 is negative for all parameter values
and B2 positive.
The value of the investment project in the region q < ˆ q consists of four
terms where the last three terms constitute the cash ﬂow generated by the
sales. The ﬁrst term A1 (KF)qb1, which is negative, corrects for the fact that
in a mathematically optimal case the production quantity of product B would
turn negative for q > ˆ q. Economically this does not make sense and therefore
the output quantity is constrained by q
B  0. The absolute value of this term
decreases with q.
In the region q  ˆ q, demand is that large that the ﬁrm uses all of its in-
stalled capacity to produce the more proﬁtable product A. This generates a
discounted cash ﬂow stream that is reﬂected in the second and third term of
the value of the investment project associated with this region. The ﬁrst term,
B2 (KF)qb2, describes the option value that accounts for the additional possi-
bility that in case demand decreases the company can switch its production
back to two products and therefore gains revenue. This option value is de-
creasing for large q.
Knowing the value of the project, V(q,KF), one is able to derive the op-
timal investment strategy. In general the procedure is as follows. First, the
optimal capacity choice K
F(q) is determined for a given level of q by setting
the marginal value of the project equal to the marginal investment costs cF.
Second, one derives the optimal investment threshold q. For this demand
level q it holds that the ﬁrm is indifferent between investment and waiting
with investment. Investment (waiting) is optimal for a q being larger (lower)
than q.
InvestmentcantakeplaceeitherinregionI,whichreferstotheregion q < ˆ q,
or in region II, i.e. the region q  ˆ q. Investing while q < ˆ q means that the
ﬁrm uses the capacity invested in, to produce both products right after the
investment has been undertaken, while investing in region q  ˆ q implies thatCHAPTER 3 57
the full capacity level is used to produce only product A.
The following proposition provides equations that implicitly determine the
threshold q
F and the corresponding capacity level K
F(q) in each of the two
cases. The optimal investment decision corresponds to the case that provides
the largest expected value of the investment project.
Proposition 1 Concerning the ﬁrm’s investment policy there are two possibilities:
1. Given that the ﬁrm produces a positive amount of both products right after the
investment moment, the optimal capacity level K




qb1 + a2q + 2a3K
F   cF = 0. (3.14)
If the obtained K is not an interior solution of the considered region, i.e. if
K >
(1 a)q
2(1 g), the optimal capacity is replaced by the boundary solution, i.e.
q
(1 a)
2(1 g). Thus, the optimal capacity choice for the demand realization q is given
by







The investment threshold q is implicitly determined by




F(q) = 0. (3.16)
2. Given that the ﬁrm uses full capacity to produce the more proﬁtable products A












F   cF = 0. (3.17)
If the obtained K does not constitute an interior solution of the region where
K 
(1 a)q










The investment threshold q is implicitly determined by
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Outofthesetwopossibilitiestheﬁrmchoosestheonethatgivesthehighestexpected












The difference with the previous section is that the ﬁrm has to decide about
optimal investment in dedicated capacities. Dedicated capacity can satisfy
only one product. It is assumed that the ﬁrm invests at the same time in both
capacity levels, provided that the ﬁrm wants to produce both products. The
ﬁrm has to decide when to invest and in how much capacity. The ﬁrm has the
following two investment options: it can invest in two dedicated production
capacities, each of which is restricted to produce one of the two products A
and B, respectively. The second option applies if the production of product B
is not proﬁtable enough in this market. In that case it is optimal for the ﬁrm
to ignore demand for product B in the market and invest in just one dedicated
production facility for product A. The unit costs of capacity are assumed to be
equal for product A and product B, i.e.
cDA = cDB =: cD. (3.20)
Higher unit cost of dedicated capacity for one of the products would result in
a proportionally lower capacity investment for this product. With assumption
(3.20) I exclude a possible impact of cost differences of the two products in
order to concentrate on the effect of product proﬁtability and substitutability
- one of the main aspects of this paper. The ﬁrm will choose the option with
the highest expected project value. After investment the ﬁrm has to produce
up to full capacity forever.
For the latter case the proﬁt of the ﬁrm is given by
P = (q   qA)qA. (3.21)
Considering the capacity clearance constraint, qA = KD,A, the proﬁt ﬂow can
be rewritten as a function of dedicated capacity KD,A:
P = (q   KD,A)KD,A. (3.22)
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In case that the ﬁrm invests at the same time in two dedicated production
facilities, for product A and product B, respectively, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm P =
pAqA + pBqB is maximize w.r.t the output rates qA and qB. Considering the
capacity clearance constraints for each product respectively, qA = KD,A and
qB = KD,B, implies that the proﬁt ﬂow is given by
P(q,KD,A,KD,B) = (q   KD,A)KD,A + (aq   KD,B)KD,B   2gKD,AKD,B.(3.24)











The optimal capacity level for every relevant value of q is derived by max-
imizing the project value minus investment cost cD(KD,A + KD,B) for a given
demand intercept level q. In case the obtained KD,i (i = A,B) is negative, the
optimal capacity is replaced by the boundary solution K
D,i(q) = 0. Knowing
the optimal capacity level for all relevant demand levels, the optimal invest-
ment threshold q is derived. The following proposition provides the expres-
sions for threshold q and the corresponding capacity level K
D(q) in each of
the two cases. The optimal investment decision corresponds to the investment
strategy that provides the largest expected project value for the ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 Concerning the ﬁrm’s investment policy for dedicated capacity
there are two possibilities:
1. Given that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in dedicated production capacity






















2(1+g) for q > ˆ qB,
(3.27)
where ˆ qA =
cD(r m)(1 g)
(1 ag) and ˆ qB =
cD(r m)(1 g)
(a g) . Total optimal dedicated


















(1+g) for ˆ qB < q.
(3.28)60 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
(3.29)
The investment thresholds are given by
q
D,I =
b1cD(r   m)(1+ g   2g2)
b1(1+ ag)   2(1+ (b1   1)g2)
, (3.30)
for region ˆ qA < q < ˆ qB and
q
D,II =
cD(r   m)(1+ a)(1  g)






2(r   m)2(1  g2)
r(1  2ag + a2)(b1   2)
s
r2c2
D(1+ a)2(b1   1)2
4(r   m)2(1+ g)2  
r2c2
D(1  2ag + a2)b1(b1   2)
2(r   m)2(1  g2)(1+ g)
, (3.31)
for region q > ˆ qB.
2. Given that it is more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to invest in just one production
capacity for product A ignoring demand for product B, the optimal capacity
















(r   m)cD. (3.33)
Out of these choices the ﬁrm chooses the one that gives the highest expected
value of the project discounted back to an initial time with demand intercept











This section presents results for investment in ﬂexible and dedicated capacity
independently. The optimal investment strategy of a ﬁrm considering both
ﬂexible and dedicated capacity, will be analyzed in Section 3.4.CHAPTER 3 61
3.3.1 Flexible Capacity Investment
As shown in section 3.3, the ﬂexible ﬁrm can either invest in the q-region I,
i.e. q 2 [0,
2(1 g)
1 a KF), where the ﬁrm sets an upper bound for output at the
moment of investment and uses this capacity to produce both products right
after the moment of investment, or invest in the second q-region, i.e. q 2
[
2(1 g)
1 a KF,¥). Investing in region II means that the ﬁrm invests in ﬂexible
capacity that is used up to full extent for production of the more proﬁtable
product A. Once investment has been made the ﬁrm is ﬂexible to adapt the
relative production volumes among products to the changing demand level.
Facing low demand it will make use of the downside potential to produce
both products in order to increase total market size. For high demand levels
the ﬁrm will use the full available capacity to produce the more proﬁtable
product A.
Figure3.1showsanexampleoftwohighlysubstitutableproductswithsub-
stitutability parameter g = 0.8, assuming a substantial difference in the prof-
itability of the two products. Product B is much less proﬁtable than product
A with a proﬁtability parameter of value a = 0.2. The other parameter values
assumed are m = 0.02, s = 0.1, r = 0.1 and cF = 100. Solving equations
(3.14) and (3.17) the optimal capacity choice for the two regions is derived.
Comparing the expected values of the investment project for the two regions
it can be concluded that it is optimal to invest in region II at the investment
trigger q = 21.147, provided that the initial q-value lies below this q. In par-
ticular, the ﬁrm invests immediately if the current value of q exceeds q, while
otherwise it waits with investment until q becomes equal to q. The optimal
size of acquired capacity is K(q) = 8.22. After the investment the ﬁrm can
adapt the relative production volume among products according to changing
demand to receive the highest possible proﬁt. For this speciﬁc numerical ex-
ample the ﬁrm will continue using full capacity to produce just product A
unless demand drops drastically, i.e. below a q-bound of ˆ q = 4.11. Since the
two products are good substitutes in the market but producing product B re-
sults in signiﬁcantly less proﬁt for the ﬁrm, it is optimal for a wide range of
demand realization to keep producing just one product, i.e. the more prof-
itable product A, with ﬂexible capacity. Just for very low demand realizations
the ﬁrm can gain proﬁt from the downside potential to avoid overcapacity by
increasing total market size including demand for product B.
Choosing a relatively low substitutability parameter (g = 0.2) but a high
proﬁtability for product B (a = 0.8) increases the value of this downside po-
tential for the ﬁrm signiﬁcantly. In fact, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in62 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
Figure 3.1: Case: a = 0.2, g = 0.8 — Optimal Investment Capacity
as a function of demand intercept q. Region I constitutes
the region where the capacity level for a speciﬁc demand
realization is used to produce both products. Region II de-
scribes the area where it is optimal for the ﬁrm to use full
capacity for the production of the more proﬁtable prod-
uct A. (Parameter values: r = 0.1, m = 0.02, s = 0.1 and
cF = 100)
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F = 22.669. Forthisparameterchoicethein-
vestment moment lies in region II which means that the ﬁrm uses purchased
capacity to produce both products at the moment of investment. Figure 3.2
(which illustrates this example) shows the optimal capacity choice as a func-
tion demand intercept q. The ﬁgure shows that unlike the previous example,
the capacity function K(q) switches at ˆ qS = 9.902 from optimal investment
in region II to optimal investment in region I. Compared to the previous ex-
ample ﬂexible capacity is very valuable for a ﬁrm selling two almost equally
proﬁtable products with a low substitutability rate. The ﬁrm purchases sig-
niﬁcantly higher capacity K(q) = 12.94. Figure 3.3 illustrates the advantage
of ﬂexible production capacity for a ﬁrm selling two almost equally proﬁtable
products with a low substitutability rate by means of the following numerical
example. The upper plot of Figure 3.3 shows a simulation of the demand in-
tercept q with a drift rate of m = 0.02 and volatility s = 0.1 for a time period of
10 years, i.e. t 2 [0,10]. The ﬁrm will invest as soon as the demand intercept
hits the value q
F = 22.669 for the ﬁrst time, which is (for this speciﬁc simula-
tion) after 1.6 years. The second plot (Figure 3.3) shows the optimal produc-
tion decision from the moment of investment on. Flexible capacity allows theCHAPTER 3 63
Figure 3.2: Case: a = 0.8, g = 0.2 — Optimal Investment Capacity as
a function of demand intercept q (Parameter values: r =
0.1, m = 0.02, s = 0.1 and cF = 100)
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ﬁrm to adapt the relative production volume of the two products, relatively,
in order to obtain the highest possible proﬁt facing its capacity constraint of
K
F(q) = 12.94. For low demand the ﬁrm uses full capacity to produce both
products. If demand rises above a certain threshold, i.e. when demand inter-
cept reaches the level ˆ q = 103.52, it is most proﬁtable to suspend production of
product B and use full capacity (i.e. K
F(q) = 12.94) to produce just product
A. Being able to adapt relative production volume optimally across the two
products allows the ﬁrm to avoid over- as well as under capacity for a wide
range of possible demand intercepts.
Subsequently I analyze the effect of demand variability on the ﬂexible in-
vestmentdecision. Fourspeciﬁc“extreme”casesthatarisefromdifferentcom-
binations of product proﬁtability and substitutability are compared: The ﬁrst
case considers a product combination of two almost similar proﬁtable prod-
ucts with low substitutability rate, indicated as ’Case: H - L’. For the numer-
ical example the parameter values a = 0.9 and g = 0.1 are chosen. ’Case H
- H’ represents a product combination of two highly substitutable and almost
equally proﬁtable products. The numerical parameter values are a = 0.9 and
g = 0.9. The third case, indicated with ’Case: L - H’, represents the setting
of a ﬁrm producing two products that are highly substitutable but one prod-
uct is signiﬁcantly less proﬁtable than the other (parameter values a = 0.1
and g = 0.9). And last but not least the case of two products with low sub-
stitutability rate (a = 0.1) and signiﬁcant difference in proﬁtability (g = 0.1)
between the products is considered. This case is referred to as ’Case: L - L’.64 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
Figure 3.3: Production Time Line for a simulation result of demand
intercept q. Panel A: Simulated demand intercept process
qt plotted against time line. Panel B: Optimal production
output of product A and B, respectively over time period
t 2 [0,10]. (Parameter values: r = 0.1, m = 0.02, s = 0.1
and cF = 100)
















Demand Intercept θ (Simulation)
θ*=22.669
A





























Output Quantity Product A: q*
A,t




The magnitude of the impact of demand variability on the optimal capac-
ity size and investment threshold are illustrated in Figure 3.4. This ﬁgure is
based on the values r = 0.1, m = 0.02 and cF = 100 which forms the base case
for numerical illustrations throughout the rest of the paper. It conﬁrms the
widely accepted result that higher uncertainty increases capacity size but de-
lays investment. When uncertainty goes up, a higher demand level is needed
before it is optimal to invest. This effect is partly caused by the fact that ca-
pacity increases with uncertainty, and partly due to the real options result that
in a more uncertain economic environment the ﬁrm has a higher incentive to
wait for more information before undertaking the investment (see Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)).
Figure 3.4 shows that the capacity size is higher for the ﬁrm selling two
products with a low substitutability rate and high proﬁtability difference. The
difference in capacity size between ’Case: L- H’ and the other cases gets more
signiﬁcant for higher uncertainty. First the difference in capacity of the 4 cases
is not so large while the proﬁt is already 50% higher (see results in Table 3.3).
While the difference in proﬁt remains approximately constant, the difference
in capacity is growing more than proportionally. This conﬁrms the intuition
that the high capacity size result is not just driven by the general argument of
’investing later in more capacity’. It is strengthened by the high value of prod-
uct ﬂexible capacity for a ﬁrm that produces two almost equally proﬁtable
products with a low substitutability rate, which increases its willingness to
invest in a high capacity level. See Panel A of Figure 3.3 that shows the high
demand range in which the ﬁrm will beneﬁt from product-ﬂexible capacity by
producing both products for a wide demand range (q 2 [0, ˆ q)) and suspend
production of product B only facing extremely high demand.
Table 3.1 shows the effect of proﬁtability on the optimal investment strat-
egy keeping the substitutability rate constant and low (g = 0.1). Observe that
the optimal capacity size and the expected proﬁt of the project are increasing
in proﬁtability of product B. The non monotonic effect of a on the investment
threshold is striking. For a graphical illustration of the non-monotonic behav-
ior of investment timing see Figure 3.5. This result is driven by two contrary
effects: on the one hand the ﬁrm invests later in more capacity while on the
other hand higher value of the project would lead the ﬁrm to invest earlier.
The capacity effect is stronger for low proﬁtability parameters while the effect
of higher project value dominates for cases of two almost equally proﬁtable
products.
Figure 3.5 shows the optimal investment thresholds for the situation when66 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
Figure 3.4: Optimal Investment Strategy comparing the following
Cases: ’Case H - L’: a = 0.9 and g = 0.1. ’Case H - H’:
a = 0.9 and g = 0.9. ’Case L - L’: a = 0.1 and g = 0.1.
’Case L - H’:a = 0.1 and g = 0.9. Panel A: Optimal Invest-
ment Threshold q as a function of demand volatility s;
Panel B: Optimal Capacities invested in K(q), as a func-
tion of volatility s. (Parameter values: r = 0.1, m = 0.02
and cF = 100)
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Table 3.1: Shows the optimal investment strategy for changing prof-
itability parameter a and ﬁxed substitutability parameter
g = 0.1. The expected proﬁt is discounted back to an initial
demand value q0 = 10 for reasons of comparison. The left
Panel shows the results for the case of uncertainty s = 0.1,
the right one for s = 0.2. (Parameter Values: r = 0.1,
m = 0.02 and cF = 100)
a qF K
F region PF qF K
F region PF
0.1 21.19 8.28 II 60.75 80.55 51.17 I 204.14
0.2 21.25 8.36 II 60.83 81.91 54.13 I 208.05
0.3 21.42 8.61 I 61.04 83.23 57.64 I 213.72
0.4 21.90 9.35 I 61.75 84.28 61.48 I 221.67
0.5 22.56 10.61 I 63.64 84.83 65.41 I 232.46
0.6 23.06 12.06 I 67.42 84.67 69.12 I 246.71
0.7 23.15 13.33 I 73.58 83.68 72.34 I 265.04
0.8 22.81 14.25 I 82.50 81.84 74.83 I 288.15
0.9 22.11 14.78 I 94.60 79.18 76.43 I 316.8568 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
Figure 3.5: Optimal Investment Threshold as a function of proﬁtabil-
ity parameter a (Parameter values: g = 0.1, r = 0.1,
m = 0.02 and cF = 100)
















the substitutability rate of the two products is low and the proﬁtability of
product B changes from low (0.1) to high (0.9). The optimal investment thresh-
old is increasing in a for low value of a and decreasing for high values of a.
This effect is stronger for environment with high demand volatility. Capacity
size and expected proﬁt are both increasing in a.
3.3.2 Dedicated Capacity Investment
Deriving the optimal investment thresholds for dedicated capacity, it is sur-
prising that for most cases the ﬁrm will decide to purchase just one dedicated
capacity for the more proﬁtable product and fully ignores demand for product
B. Table 3.2 shows the optimal investment thresholds for a speciﬁc parameter
choice, comparing the previously introduced four cases. For the case of almost
equally proﬁtable products with a low substitutability rate the ﬁrm purchases
signiﬁcantly more dedicated capacity for product A than for the (slightly) less
proﬁtable product B. For all other cases the ﬁrm would commit itself at the
moment of investment to have just one capacity for product A at its disposal
forever. To build intuition for this result, note that in the three latter cases
demand would have to fall very low so that the ﬁrm can actually gain from
the possibility to make the total market size bigger with producing the second
(less proﬁtable) product B. For most demand intercept realizations it can gainCHAPTER 3 69
Table 3.2: Investment Strategies of Dedicated Capacity investment for
the previously introduced cases (description see ﬁgure 3.4).
(Parameter values: L = 0.1, H = 0.9, r = 0.1, m = 0.02 and
cD = 100)





0.05 16.0587 4.6802 3.56501 8.24522
0.1 22.1392 8.17342 6.63597 14.8094
0.15 35.5252 15.8636 13.3966 29.2602
0.2 79.4644 41.1065 35.5881 76.6946







highest proﬁt satisfying just the demand for product A. The threat of possible
overcapacity of product B dominates the value of the downside potential to
increase total market demand by producing both products for low demand
realizations.
Only the ﬁrm that faces a product combination of two similarly proﬁtable
products with a low substitutability rate can proﬁt from this downside poten-
tial at a wide range of demand.
3.4 Value of Flexibility
One of the main objectives of this paper is to quantify the value of ﬂexible
capacity. In order to derive the ﬂexibility value, the situation in which a ﬁrm
relies on maximally two dedicated capacities rather than on one ﬂexible ca-
pacity is considered as a benchmark. The two optimal investment strategies
for ﬂexible and dedicated capacity investment are compared assuming that
the unit investment cost of ﬂexible and dedicated capacity are equally high,
i.e. cD = cF =: c. The value of ﬂexibility is therefore given by the difference in70 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
expected proﬁt of the ﬂexible and dedicated capacity investment strategies.
In order to compare two investment strategies that have different opti-
mal moments of investment, one needs to compare the discounted expected
project values. Assuming the optimal investment thresholds derived in Sec-




















where the expected project values are discounted back to the beginning of the
considered time period with the initial demand intercept q0.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the value of ﬂexibility (Vf) for the numerical
example presented in the previous section. The discounted expected project
values, denoted by Pi for i = D, F are discounted back to the beginning of
the considered time period, where the demand level is given by q0 = 10. Fur-




Table 3.3 shows that the value of ﬂexibility is most signiﬁcant if uncertainty
is high, substitutability low, and proﬁt levels between the two products are
substantially different (see Case a = L, g = L). Assuming demand uncer-
tainty of s = 0.2, substitutability parameter g equal to 0.1 and low proﬁtabil-
ity of product B compared to product A, the value of ﬂexibility is substantially
higher than for the other cases. Flexibility especially pays off in this case be-
cause it allows the ﬁrm to avoid over-capacity by increasing the market size
including the less proﬁtable product in production for cases of low demand,
while a dedicated ﬁrm restricts itself in the optimal case to just one capac-
ity for the more proﬁtable product. As the optimal investment capacity for
the ﬂexible ﬁrm is signiﬁcantly higher (K
F = 51.17) than for the dedicated
ﬁrm (K
D = 42.36), the ﬂexible ﬁrm is additionally less threatened by under-
capacity in high demand periods.
Table 3.4 shows a wider range of proﬁtability and substitutability parame-
ter combinations. Considering the previous result, that ﬂexibility is most valu-
able in case of high demand uncertainty, s is chosen to be equal to s = 0.2.
Three cases, of low (g = 0.1), medium (g = 0.5) and high (g = 0.9) prod-
uct substitutability, are shown. The proﬁtability parameter is ranging from a
value close to zero (a = 0.1) to a value close to one (g = 0.9). As expected
the value of ﬂexibility is highest in case of low substitutability and low levels
of the proﬁtability parameter, speciﬁcally a = 0.1,0.3 and 0.5. Increasing a
from 0.1 to 0.5, the difference in adopted capacity between the ﬂexible and the
dedicated case (K
F   K
D) is high and decreasing in a. This indicates, that theCHAPTER 3 71
Table 3.3: Optimal Proﬁts of ﬂexible and dedicated investment, re-
spectively, discounted back to the initial demand level q0 =
10 comparing four cases (description of these cases can be
found in caption of Figure 3.4).
PF (PD)...discounted expected proﬁt of the ﬂexible (dedi-
cated) capacity. Expression Vf denotes the Value of Flex-
ibility. (Parameter values: L = 0.1, H = 0.9, r = 0.1,










CASE: a = H, g = L
0.05 16.05 8.23 52.67 16.06 4.68 3.57 8.25 52.59 0.09 99.83
0.1 22.11 14.78 94.60 22.14 8.17 6.64 14.81 94.38 0. 99.77
0.15 35.44 29.18 172.06 35.53 15.86 13.40 29.26 171.49 0.57 99.67
0.2 79.18 76.43 316.85 79.46 41.11 35.59 76.69 315.41 1.44 99.55
CASE: a = H, g = H
0.05 15.36 4.60 35.30 15.36 4.60 0 4.60 35.30 0 100
0.1 21.15 8.22 60.69 21.15 8.22 0 8.22 60.69 0.01 99.99
0.15 33.97 16.30 107.42 33.90 16.19 0 16.19 107.25 0.17 99.84
0.2 76.14 43.02 194.67 75.78 42.36 0 42.36 193.74 0.93 99.52
CASE: a = L, g = L
0.05 15.36 4.60 35.30 15.36 4.60 0 4.60 35.30 0 100
0.1 21.19 8.28 60.75 21.15 8.22 0 8.22 60.69 0.07 99.89
0.15 34.71 17.49 108.98 33.90 16.19 0 16.19 107.25 1.73 98.41
0.2 80.55 51.17 204.14 75.78 42.36 0 42.36 193.74 10.40 94.90
CASE: a = L, g = H
0.05 15.36 4.60 35.30 15.36 4.60 0 4.60 35.30 0 100
0.1 21.15 8.22 60.69 21.15 8.22 0 8.22 60.69 0 100
0.15 33.90 16.19 107.25 33.90 16.19 0 16.19 107.25 0 100
0.2 75.78 42.37 193.75 75.78 42.36 0 42.36 193.74 0.01 99.9972 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
Figure 3.6: cF astheunitcostofﬂexiblecapacitythattheﬁrmiswilling
to pay so that the expected project values for ﬂexible and
dedicated capacity investment are equal, i.e. PF = PD,
assuming that cD = 100. (Parameter values: g = 0.1, r =
0.1, m = 0.02, s = 0.2 and q0 = 10.)












advantage of ﬂexible capacity in high demand regions decreases with a. On
the other hand the demand range for which the ﬁrm will produce both prod-
ucts, i.e. ˆ q, increases with a, which allows the ﬁrm to proﬁt more from the
downside potential of ﬂexible capacity. The value of ﬂexibility is highest for
a = 0.3.
These results are for matter of comparison derived assuming that the unit
cost of dedicated and of ﬂexible capacity are equally high. However, ﬂexible
capacity is in most cases more expensive than dedicated capacity. Increas-
ing the unit cost of ﬂexible capacity to a level at which the expected value of
ﬂexible investment (PF) is equally high to the expected value of dedicated
investment (PD), shows how much more a ﬁrm is willing to pay for ﬂexible
capacity. The results are striking. Table 3.6 shows the level of unit cost of ﬂexi-
ble capacity for which PF = PD, as a function of the proﬁtability parameter in
case substitutability is low g = 0.1 and demand uncertainty high s = 0.2. For
ahighdifferenceinproﬁtabilitylevelsofthetwoproducts, i.e. alpha = 0.1, the
unit cost of ﬂexible capacity can increase by 25% compared to dedicated unit
cost. In case a = 0.3 the ﬁrm would even pay 40% more for ﬂexible capacity.
The relatively low value of ﬂexibility in the other product combination
cases is partly driven by the fact that the ﬁrm can freely decide the optimal
amount of capacity invested in for the ﬂexible and the dedicated case, respec-CHAPTER 3 73
Table 3.4: Optimal Proﬁts of ﬂexible and dedicated investment, re-
spectively, discounted back to the initial demand level q0 =
10. PF (PD)...discounted expected proﬁt of the ﬂexible
(dedicated) capacity. Expression Vf denotes the Value of
Flexibility. ˆ q is the boundary as which it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to change from producing both products to use full
capacity just for product A. (Parameter values: s = 0.2,
r = 0.1, m = 0.02 and c = 100)
a q
F K







CASE: g = L = 0.1
0.1 80.6 51.2 102 204.1 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 10.4 94.9
0.3 83.2 57.6 148.1 213.7 82.3 45.8 5.8 51.7 196.6 17.1 92.0
0.5 84.8 65.4 235.5 232.5 87.5 47.9 17.6 65.5 217.1 15.4 93.4
0.7 83.7 72.3 433.8 265.0 85.49 45.7 27.8 73.5 256.6 8.4 96.8
0.9 79.2 76.4 1375 316.9 79.5 41.1 35.6 76.7 315.4 1.5 99.5
CASE: g = M = 0.5
0.1 76.3 43.3 48.1 195.0 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 1.3 99.3
0.3 76.3 43.76 62.5 196.0 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 2.3 98.9
0.5 77.9 46.3 92.6 198.9 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 5.2 97.4
0.7 79.7 51.0 170 208.6 80.6 40.3 10.1 50.4 200.8 7.8 96.3
0.9 78.6 55.6 556.0 234.7 79.0 32.9 23.0 55.9 232.7 2.0 99.1
CASE: g = H = 0.9
0.1 75.8 42.4 9.4 193.7 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 0 100
0.3 75.8 42.4 12.1 193.8 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 0.1 99.9
0.5 75.8 42.4 17.0 193.8 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 0.1 99.9
0.7 75.8 42.4 28.3 193.8 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 0.1 99.9
0.9 76.1 43.0 86.0 194.7 75.8 42.4 0 42.4 193.7 1.0 99.574 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
tively, and choose to ignore the demand for the less proﬁtable product B by
just purchasing one dedicated capacity. Often, though, ﬁrms are faced with
the decision whether or not to invest in ﬂexible capacity when they already
installed dedicated capacity at an earlier point of time and are currently pro-
ducing with this dedicated capacity. Therefore, I evaluate this problem in the
following section.
3.5 Incentive to Change from Dedicated to Flexible
Capacity
Assume that a ﬁrm currently producing with two installed dedicated capaci-
ties for each of its products, A and B, can switch to ﬂexible capacity by paying
an investment cost of cFKF. In the following I will analyze for which speciﬁc
product mix and the parameter ranges a ﬁrm has more or less incentive to
switch from dedicated to ﬂexible capacity. The dedicated capacities installed
are given by KD,A and KD,B. Let VD(q,KD,A,KD,B) be the expected value of the
ﬁrm producing with the installed dedicated capacities forever starting with a
demand intercept q. Similarly the value of the ﬁrm producing with ﬂexible ca-
pacity forever is given by VF(q,KF), assuming an amount of ﬂexible capacity
of KF. The expressions for VF and VD are equal to the project values derived in
Section 3.2 and 2.2, respectively. The threshold at which it is optimal to switch
from dedicated capacity to ﬂexible capacity, must satisfy the standard pair of
conditions for optimal exercise, which are the value matching
h
VD(q,KD,A,KD,B) + D1qb1 + D2qb2
i  
q=q = [VF(q,KF)   cFKF]jq=q , (3.35)

















D1qb1 and D2qb2 are option values. Speciﬁcally, D1qb1 is the value of the op-
tion of the ﬁrm to purchase ﬂexible capacity and increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in
case q increases. D2qb2 isthe valueof theoptionto gainproﬁtat alater pointin
time by installing ﬂexible capacity in case demand decreases. As shown in the
previous section, ﬂexibility is especially preferable in very low and very high
demand regions. Therefore, we know that the function [VF  VD](q) is convexCHAPTER 3 75
in the demand intercept q. There are two effects that may increase the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt when adopting ﬂexible technology. On the one hand it can optimally
adapt the product mix to demand. This means that it can use full capacity
to produce the more proﬁtable product if demand is high. If demand is low
it can increase total market demand by producing both products optimally
adapting the output rates of the two products. On the other hand, the ﬁrm
can also gain by investing in ﬂexible capacity because it can update the op-
timal total capacity size having more actual information about the economic
environment than at the moment when dedicated capacity was installed. If
demand is high the ﬁrm can gain by increasing total capacity. If demand is
low it can proﬁt by downscaling total capacity. Recall that downscaling can
be valuable for the ﬁrm because the ﬁrm is restricted to use full capacity for
production, i.e. the capacity clearance assumption. D2qb2 can therefore partly
be seen as the value of a disinvestment option. However, I want to concen-
trate in the analysis on the additional value gained by ﬂexibility in compari-
son to dedicated capacity in high demand regions. Therefore, I assume that
KF  KD,A + KD,B, which excludes the possibility of disinvestment from the
problem. Furthermore, I rule out scenarios where it might be favorable to in-
vest in ﬂexible capacity with regard to its downside potential. Therefore, I
set a lower boundary for the investment cost, so that the value of ﬂexibility
won’t exceed the cost of investment in low demand regions. Assuming that








, it follows that D2 = 0. For the derivation of this
boundary I refer to Appendix D. Therefore, the value matching and smooth





















ger for both regions.
Proposition 3 Consider the ﬁrm’s policy to switch to ﬂexible capacity KF, while
currently producing with two dedicated capacities KD,A and KD,B. Assuming that






















D,A + 2gKD,AKD,B + K2
D,B
r
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for region II (i.e. q 
2(1 g)KF
1 a ).
Table 3.5 presents the optimal investment thresholds for different product
combinations. The results in Table 3.5 are derived assuming parameter values
r = 0.1, m = 0.02, unit cost of ﬂexible capacity cF = 10 and two dedicated
capacities for each product of size KD,A = 8 and KD,B = 6, respectively. De-
mand volatility ranges from s = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 to 0.2. As in the previous
sections a = L means that the difference in proﬁtability of the two products is
high, i.e. product A is much more proﬁtable than product B. If a = H the two
products are almost equally proﬁtable. For the particular numerical example
presented in Table 3.5, L = 0.1 and H = 0.9. The same numerical values for L
and H are chosen for the substitutability parameter g.
Regarding the optimal timing to change from dedicated to ﬂexible capacity,
I ﬁnd that the investment threshold differs substantially for different product
combinations. This crucial impact is surprising, given the fact that the de-
mand of the products is assumed to be perfectly positively correlated. The
ﬁrm invests earlier in ﬂexible capacity if the proﬁtability of the two products is
substantially different (see case g = L), while for a product mix of two almost
equally proﬁtable products, a higher demand threshold is required in order
to undergo investment in ﬂexible capacity. If demand uncertainty is equal to
s = 0.1 for example, the optimal investment threshold is equal to q = 156.27
for low substitutability and equal to q = 45.63 for high substitutability if
the proﬁt level of both products is high. If the products differ substantially
in proﬁtability, the optimal investment threshold is substantially lower and
equal to q = 17.36 in case of low substitutability and equal to q = 5.07 in
case of high substitutability. Since product A is much more proﬁtable in case a
is low, the ﬁrm could increase its proﬁt substantially by rising the output rate
for product A. Therefore, the value of waiting is dominated by the “cost” of
lost proﬁt the ﬁrm would face if it continues producing too much of product
B in relation to the more proﬁtable product A.
A ﬁrm that produces two products with a low substitutability rate and sim-
ilar proﬁtability, will change from two dedicated to the ﬂexible capacity, keep-
ing the total amount of capacity the same, only in case of high demand. TheCHAPTER 3 77
Table 3.5: The optimal investment threshold (q(KF)) to adopt ﬂexible
technology currently using dedicated capacities of amount
KD,A = 8 and KD,B = 6 for different values of KF. (Parame-
ter values: L = 0.1, H = 0.9, r = 0.1, m = 0.02 and cF = 10)
s q(14) qA(q) qB(q) q(15) qA(q) qB(q) q(16) qA(q) qB(q)
CASE: a = H, g = L
0.05 143.3 10.98 3.02 34.26 8.45 6.55 27.05 8.75 7.25
0.1 156.3 11.34 2.66 37.76 8.55 6.45 29.84 8.83 7.17
0.15 170.3 11.73 2.27 42.04 8.67 6.33 33.25 8.92 7.08
0.2 184.5 12.12 1.88 46.89 8.80 6.20 37.14 9.03 6.97
CASE: a = L, g = L
0.05 15.92 10.98 3.02 18.63 12.16 2.84 20.61 13.15 2.85
0.1 17.36 11.34 2.66 20.36 12.59 2.41 22.56 13.64 2.36
0.15 18.93 11.73 2.27 22.29 13.07 1.93 24.75 14.19 1.81
0.2 20.50 12.12 1.88 24.29 13.57 1.43 27.05 14.76 1.24
CASE: a = H, g = H
0.05 41.38 14 0 35.25 15 0 34.63 16 0
0.1 45.63 14 0 38.83 15 0 38.15 16 0
0.15 50.68 14 0 43.14 15 0 42.41 16 0
0.2 56.20 14 0 47.96 15 0 47.21 16 0
CASE: a = L, g = H
0.05 4.6 14 0 8.81 15 0 12.17 16 0
0.1 5.07 14 0 9.72 15 0 13.43 16 0
0.15 5.63 14 0 10.84 15 0 14.97 16 0
0.2 6.24 14 0 12.1 15 0 16.73 16 078 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY
ﬁrm does not have a strong incentive to change to ﬂexible capacity because
dedicated capacities of size KD,A = 8 and KD,B = 6 are a good choice for this
speciﬁc product combination and therefore, the ﬁrm cannot increase its proﬁt
a lot by changing to ﬂexible capacity. However, if the ﬁrm would be able to
increase its total capacity with investment in ﬂexible capacity, this would ac-
celerate the investment substantially to a threshold q = 37.76 for the case of
KF = 15 and even more to an investment trigger of q = 29.84 for the case of
KF = 16. The favorable product combination results in a large option value
to increase total capacity and therefore the ﬁrm invests earlier if total capacity
can be increased.
In case a = L, i.e. product B is much less proﬁtable than product A, the
opposite holds. The possibility to increase total capacity delays investment.
There are two contrary effects that either accelerate or delay investment if
the ﬁrm can increase total capacity. On the one hand, the ﬁrm can increase its
proﬁt due to larger production capacity and therefore wants to invest earlier,
while on the other hand higher capacity investment increases total investment
costs. The ﬁrm waits longer before investing, because a higher demand level
is necessary to proﬁt from this investment. In case (a = L,g = H), the cost
effect dominates.
The following two cases presented in Table 3.5 refer to the investment de-
cision of a ﬁrm producing two highly substitutable goods. Due to the high
substitutability of the two products, the ﬁrm tends to concentrate on the pro-
duction of the more proﬁtable product A. It strives to avoid competing with
itself in the market. Therefore, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to switch to ﬂexible
capacity early in order to change the unfavorable output rate mix, to which it
is restricted by the currently installed dedicated capacities. I distinguish again
two cases: If one of the products is signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable than the other,
the ﬁrm is eager to adapt the reinforced output rate mix and changes to ﬂexi-
ble capacity soon. Since the market is not so large the ﬁrm prefers in the ﬁrst
run to optimally adapt the output rates and not to extend capacity. Therefore,
the investment threshold increases with the amount of capacity KF invested
in. The investment cost effect dominates here. However, if the two prod-
ucts are almost equally proﬁtable the ﬁrm faces a better market situation and
therefore prefers to increase total capacity in order to increase the output rate
for the more proﬁtable product A. That leads to the fact that the investment
threshold decreases with higher capacity purchase.
Furthermore, the optimal output levels at the moment of investment do not
change with the proﬁtability parameter a. Uncertainty determines the optimalCHAPTER 3 79
output split at the moment of investment, while a determines the timing. I an-
alyze the investment timing considering the optimal investment threshold q.
However, theexpectedtimeofinvestmentisequaltotheexpectedtimethede-
mand intercept process hits the investment threshold q. Since the expected
time of investment5 is monotonic in the investment threshold for the consid-
ered parameter ranges, one can analyze the qualitative results regarding the
investment timing taking into account the investment threshold q.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper considers the timing and capacity choice of a ﬁrm facing stochas-
tic demand. Two types of capacity investment are distinguished. The ﬂex-
ible capacity investment allows the ﬁrm to produce both products with the
same production facility, while investment in dedicated capacity investment
restricts the ﬁrm to produce just one product by purchased dedicated produc-
tion facility. The ﬁrm makes three decisions: choice of investment time, choice
of capacity, and type of capacity investment, i.e. ﬂexible or dedicated. Con-
cerning the timing and capacity decision I develop implicit solutions, which
are investigated numerically. I show that for both ﬂexible and dedicated ca-
pacity investment, the ﬁrm invests later in higher capacity if demand uncer-
tainty increases. Flexibility especially pays off when uncertainty is high, sub-
stitutability low, and proﬁt levels between the two products are substantially
different. In the ﬂexible case, under high demand the ﬁrm just produces the
most proﬁtable product, if demand is low the ﬁrm produces both products to
increase total demand. In the dedicated case the ﬁrm invests in both capac-
ities if the substitutability rate is low and proﬁtability of both products high
enough. Otherwise the ﬁrm will ignore demand for the less proﬁtable product
in the market and install just one dedicated capacity.
Considering a ﬁrm’s decision to change from dedicated to ﬂexible capacity,
currently producing with dedicated one, it is shown that apart from demand
volatility this decision is substantially affected by the speciﬁc product com-
bination of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm undertakes the change to ﬂexible investment
even in low demand scenarios in case the proﬁtability of the two products is











for s2 < 2m,
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substantially different. The option to increase total capacity accelerates invest-
ment if demand for both products is substantially high.
Numerous extensions of this model deserve further analysis. This includes
analyzing different cost structures, asymmetric demand curves, and different
demand functions. Another interesting extension would be to allow multi-
ple investments. Proceeding stepwise would add additional ﬂexibility as the
ﬁrm can respond to resolving uncertainty by choosing the investment tim-
ing individually for each step. Extending this model to a two-factor model
with each products’ demand intercept following a separate stochastic process,
would allow to include the effect of demand correlation into the problem. This
promises a challenging and interesting idea for future research.
The framework I analyzed was a single ﬁrm model. However, as appli-
cations for this model I mentioned several examples in car or food industry,
which are not monopolies. Therefore, a natural next step is certainly to add
strategic interactions to the problem.CHAPTER 3 81
3.A Appendix
Flexible Capacity





A1qb1 + a1q2 + a2qKF + a3K2












In order to check the second order condition for the optimal capacities I derive




















































































Corollary 1 The variable A1 is negative and the variable B2 is positive for the
considered parameter ranges.









































Since it holds that b2 < 0 and b1 > 1, one can easily see that the left part of the













, is negative, as well
























part of A1 is given by F(b2) and the right part of B2 is given by F(b1). If it
holds that F(.) is positive at the point b2 it is proved that the variable A1 is
negative for the considered parameter ranges. A similar argument holds for
variable B2. If it holds that F(.) is negative at the point b1 it is proved that









2m2 + (r + m)s2
2r(r   m)(r   2m   s2)

, (3.49)
one can easily see that the function is linear with a negative slope, crossing
the horizontal axes at the point b0 =
2r(m+s2)
2m2+(m+r)s2 > 0. We know that b2 < 0
and therefore F(b2) must be positive. It remains to show that b0 < b1 in order
to verify that F(b1) < 0. To show that b0 < b1, we evaluate the quadratic
equation Q(b) (see equation (3.11)) at the point b0. The quadratic expression
at b0 is given by
Q(b0) =  
(r   m)rs4(2m   r + s2)
(2m2 + (r + m)s2)2 < 0. (3.50)
The graph Q(b) is an upward-pointing parabola that goes to ¥ as b goes to
¥ (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) about the “Fundamental Quadratic”) and
crosses the horizontal axis at b1 and b2. Since Q(b0) is negative we know that
the relation b0 < b1 must hold. And therefore, it is shown that F(b1) < 0. 2
Dedicated Capacity
Derivations for Proposition 2:
1. Two Capacities Case: The optimal capacity choice is derived by maxi-
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Solving the value-matching and smooth pasting conditions assuming
that the capacity is given as function of the demand intercept q that
solves equation (3.51), leads to the optimal investment thresholds. For
region ˆ qA < q < ˆ qB this results in the following two thresholds:
q
1,1 =





b1cD(r   m)(1+ g   2g2)
b1(1+ ag)   2(1+ g2(b1   1))
. (3.53)
Since q
1,1 = ˆ qA, q
1,2 is the unique optimal investment threshold for this
region.





q2r(1+ a2   2ag)













One can derive the following two solutions of equation (3.54)
q
1 =
cD(r   m)(1+ a)(1  g)






2(r   m)2(1  g2)
r(1  2ag + a2)(b1   2)
s
r2c2
D(1+ a)2(b1   1)2
4(r   m)2(1+ g)2  
r2c2
D(1  2ag + a2)b1(b1   2)




cD(r   m)(1+ a)(1  g)






2(r   m)2(1  g2)
r(1  2ag + a2)(b1   2)
s
r2c2
D(1+ a)2(b1   1)2
4(r   m)2(1+ g)2  
r2c2
D(1  2ag + a2)b1(b1   2)
2(r   m)2(1  g2)(1+ g)
. (3.56)
Since ˆ qB > q
2, q
1 is the investment threshold of this region.
2. One Capacity Case: The optimal capacity choice is derived by maxi-





resulting in an optimal capacity choice K






[q   (r   m)cD]. (3.58)84 PRODUCT FLEXIBILITY














The value of the option is given by
F(q) = A1qb1. (3.60)
Value matching and smooth pasting the project value with the value of













For further explanation for the derivation of the investment threshold by
value-matching and smooth pasting see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Com-
bining equation (3.58) and (3.61) gives the optimal investment threshold
q
D shown in equation (3.33). The optimal capacity choice at the moment







The formula for E[e rT], when q follows the geometric Brownian motion pre-
sented in equation (3.3), and T is the random ﬁrst time the process reaches a







where T is the (random) ﬁrst time when process q reaches ¯ q. See e.g. Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) for further explanation.
Incentive to Change from Dedicated to Flexible Capacity
In order to rule out the scenarios where the downside potential of ﬂexibility
exceeds the effect of investment cost, one needs to impose a downside bound-
ary on the unit investment cost cF. The function [VF   VD](q) is convex in the
demand intercept q. Therefore, one can conclude that there is no downside
potential of ﬂexibility present, if the following holdsCHAPTER 3 85




D,A + 2gKD,AKD,B + K2
D,B
r
  cFKF < 0. (3.65)
Since I assume that KF  KD,A + KD,B, the condition (3.64) has to be fulﬁlled















Proof of Proposition 1
The procedure of this proof is analogous to the steps in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 presented in the Appendix of Chapter 2. For certain choices of the
parameters, it may happen that equations (3.14) or (3.17) do not have an ad-
missible solution, meaning that the function V(q,KF)  cFKF) is monotonic in
KF in region I or II. If this is the case, then V(q,KF)   cFKF) shows an increas-
ing or a decreasing behavior in KF. However, if equations (3.14) or (3.17) have
an admissible solution, then it means that the function [V(q,KF)   cFKF)] is
concave in that region, and therefore has a local maximum. One has to take
into account the local behavior of [Vi(q,KF)   cFKF)] if it is monotonic KF. For
region I, one can rule out the decreasing case, because it means that the opti-
mal capacity level KF would be zero, and thus the output rate would be zero.




one should rule out the increasing case, because it would mean that optimally
an inﬁnite capacity level should be chosen. In the decreasing case, one should
choose the minimum allowed capacity for this region, which is q
(1 a)
2(1 g).
Proof of Proposition 3
The equations that implicitly determine the investment threshold q are de-
rived combining the value matching and smooth pasting conditions shown in
equations (3.37) and (3.38).CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION WHEN THE
ARRIVAL RATE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES CHANGES1
This chapter contributes to the literature of technology adoption. In most of
these models it is assumed that after the arrival of a new technology the prob-
ability of the next arrival is constant. This chapter extends this approach by
assuming that after the last technology jump the probability of a new arrival
can change. Right after the arrival of a new technology the intensity equals
a speciﬁc value that switches if no new technology arrival has taken place
within a certain period after the last technology arrival. We look at different
scenarios, dependentonwhethertheﬁrmisthreatenedbyadropinthearrival
rate after a certain time period or expects the rate of new arrivals to rise.
We analyze the effect of variance of time between two consecutive arrivals
on the optimal investment timing and show that larger variance accelerates
investment in a new technology in case the arrival rate increases if no new
arrival takes place within a speciﬁc time period after the last arrival. For the
case that the arrival rate is supposed to decrease, increasing variance has a
non-monotonic effect on investment timing. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms often adopt a
new technology a time lag after its introduction, which is a phenomenon fre-
quently observed in practice. Regarding a ﬁrm’s technology releasing strategy
we explain why clear signals set by regular and steady release of new product
generations stimulates customers buying behavior. Depending on whether
the arrival rate is assumed to change or be constant over time, the optimal
1This chapter is based on (Hagspiel et al., 2011, b).
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technology adoption timing changes signiﬁcantly. In a further step we add an
additional source of uncertainty to the problem. We assume that the length of
the time period, after which the arrival intensity changes, is not known to the
ﬁrm in advance. Here, we ﬁnd that increasing uncertainty accelerates invest-
ment, a result that is opposite to the standard real options theory.
4.1 Introduction
The trend in innovation arrivals regarding capabilities of digital electronic de-
vices is strongly linked to the famous statement of Gordon E. Moore about
computing hardware. He described that ’the number of transistors that can
be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit doubles approximately ev-
ery two years’. Observed over several periods of decades we see that sev-
eral measures of digital technology are improving at exponential rates related
to Moore’s law, including the size, cost, density and speed of components.
Processing speed, memory capacity and sensors, all of these are improving
at (roughly) exponential rates as well. His law is now used in the semicon-
ductor industry to guide long-term planning and to set targets for research
and development. On the other hand, managers have to consider that this
technological innovation progress has natural boundaries. At some point the
physical possibilities of improvement are exhausted. This means that the rate
of improvements approaches zero at some point. Ignoring this fact, and in-
stead assuming that technological improvements evolve at exponential rates
forever, would lead to crucial mistakes in a ﬁrm’s technology adoption deci-
sions. However, the literature of technology adoption widely assumes that
arrival rates for technological innovations are constant. This assumption has
been made among others in McCardle (1985), Farzin et al. (1998) and Huis-
man (2001). In this paper we want to relax this assumption and assume that
the arrival rate of technological innovation changes.
Another example of a technology adoption decision, where arrival rates
should not be considered as constant, is typical for the consumer electronics
industry. Big companies like Apple, release new improved versions of their
most popular electronic devices on a regular basis. Apple released, for exam-
ple, a ﬁrst version of the iPod Mini in February 2004 and announced a second
generation of the iPod Mini in February of the following year. In September
2005 Apple ofﬁcially discontinued the iPond Mini line and replaced it by the
iPod Nano. The ﬁrst generation of iPod Nano was replaced by the second
generation in September 2006. From then on Apple updated the iPod NanoCHAPTER 4 89
on a regular basis every year2. From the point of view of the consumer this
means that right after the release of a new iPod Nano generation, one does
not expect a new release soon. However, after one year without any release,
one would expect Apple to announce a new series of the product line. In this
paper we raise the question of how such a clear product release policy would
inﬂuence the consumer’s consumption behavior.
In this paper, we investigate the role of a ﬁrm that decides about technology
adoption with an investment to change from old to new technology facing un-
certain improvement size and timing of future technology improvements. The
technological process advances exogenously to the ﬁrm. A large ﬁxed cost oc-
cursupontheadoption, whichbecomesasunkcostbecausetechnologychoice
is irreversible. We assume that the arrival rate is changing over time, unlike
the assumption of constant arrival prevalent in the technology adoption liter-
ature. Speciﬁcally, we assume a speciﬁc arrival rate to be present right after
the last technology arrival. This arrival rate changes (increase/decrease) to
another value if no arrival should take place for a certain time period (of D
time units) since the last technology arrival.
We do not impose a speciﬁc ordering of these two values of the arrival rate,
which allows to look at two different scenarios that constitute for different
technology adoption environments faced by ﬁrms or customers. The ﬁrst sce-
nario gives attention to technology adoption decisions when the arrival of a
new innovation would increase in case a certain time period has passed. Sec-
ond, we analyze the optimal investment behavior of ﬁrms that are aware of
the fact that the rate of a new arrival could decrease.
Speciﬁcally, we study the technology adoption decision of a single ﬁrm in
the absence of strategic considerations. We describe the ﬁrm’s adoption de-
cision as the solution of an inﬁnite horizon dynamic programming problem
in a continuous time setting. The ﬁrm decides about the optimal moment to
adopt a new technology, while it currently uses a less efﬁcient technology. The
improvement in the value of the available technology follows a compound
Poisson process and evolves exogenously to the ﬁrm. Technologies become
more valuable over time. At each moment in time the ﬁrm learns whether an
innovation occurs or not.
We focus our analysis on the optimal adoption strategies of a ﬁrm facing
changing arrival rate, also in comparison to the results of a constant arrival
rate model. We introduce possible applications and analyze numerical exam-
2See http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ipod#Timeline_of_iPodmodels for a graphical illustra-
tion of the time line of iPod models and the releases of improved versions from 2001 on.90 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
ples suited to those in order to gain more insight about the optimal timing
strategy for technology adoption in speciﬁc scenarios. Generally, we show
that a ﬁrm expecting a decrease in the arrival rate after a certain period with-
out any arrival, should apply a different adoption timing strategy than a ﬁrm
assuming constant arrival rate forever. In case a ﬁrm is confronted with a low
arrival rate right after the last technology arrival while it expects an increase in
the arrival rate after a certain period of time without any arrival, it should in-
vest later than a ﬁrm that in expectation assumes the same but constant arrival
intensity.
Introducing a model with changing arrival rate allows us to explain the fact
that ﬁrms often adopt new technology a time lag after its arrival, while models
with constant arrival rate neglect this phenomenon. As criticized by Cho and
McCardle (2009) and Doraszelski (2004), “due to the memoryless and station-
ary probability distribution (resulting from the fact that the technology pro-
cess advances according to a compound Poisson process), Huisman (2001)’s
model does not explain a time lag between the occurrence of an innovation
and its adoption.” Extending Huisman’s model to changing arrival rate we
can explain in which cases the ﬁrm optimally adopts a new innovation a time
lag after the innovation took place. In fact our analysis shows that the proba-
bility of a time lag between innovation and adoption is substantially high.
Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the variance of time between two
consecutive technology innovations on the ﬁrm’s adoption decision keeping
the expected time between two technology arrivals ﬁxed. The introduction
of a changing arrival rate to the basic problem introduced by Huisman (2001)
adds to the signiﬁcance of our results by one additional degree of freedom.
Which effect increasing variance has on the technology adoption decision de-
pends on the scenario considered: In case the arrival rate would increase if
no new arrival takes place within a certain time period after the last technol-
ogy arrival, we ﬁnd that increasing variance decelerates technology adoption.
Regarding a ﬁrm’s product release strategy we show that it can accelerate the
buying behavior of its customers by following a consistent release schedule.
Considering the other case, (i.e. the arrival rate would decrease if no new
arrival happens for a period of time while it is relatively high right after the
last technology arrival,) increasing variance has a non-monotonic effect on
technology adoption timing. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that increasing variance
decreases the probability that the ﬁrm will a adopt better technology a time
lag after it has been introduced.
In a further step we generalize the problem so that the moment at which theCHAPTER 4 91
arrival rate switches is not known to the ﬁrm beforehand but assumed to be
stochastic. This generalization leads to the result that increasing uncertainty
accelerates investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we re-
view the related literature in technology adoption models. A short summary
of the standard model with constant arrival rate follows in Section 4.3 before
we present our model with changing arrival rate and characterize the optimal
investment policy. Section 4.4 continues with comparative statics of the opti-
mal adoption policy and presents two numerical examples. In Section 4.5 we
extend our analysis to the fact that the moment of change in arrival rate is not
known by the ﬁrm but uncertain. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Our work extends the literature on technology adoption, especially by im-
proving the modeling of the technological progress. While in most models it
is assumed that the probability of the next technology arrival is constant, we
consider the technology adoption problem of a ﬁrm facing a changing arrival
probability.
Therewith, we add to a strand of papers that started with early work of
Baldwin (1982), Balcer and Lippman (1984) as well as McCardle (1985). For an
extensive survey about decision theoretic models of technology adoption see
Huisman (2001) and Hoppe (2002).
Balcer and Lippman (1984) study the optimal time to adopt the best cur-
rently available technology when multiple adoptions are allowed. In their
model, timing and the value of future innovations is uncertain although the
proﬁtability of the currently available technology is known. They show that
it is optimal to adopt the best currently available technology if the techno-
logical lag exceeds a certain threshold, which depends upon the elapsed time
since the last innovation and the pace of the technological progress. McCar-
dle (1985) concentrates on the fact that the proﬁtability of a new technology
is rarely known with certainty at its announcement date. The ﬁrm can se-
quentially gather information, updating its prior estimate of proﬁtability in a
Bayesian manner. He derives two thresholds where crossing the upper thresh-
old the ﬁrm stops collecting information and adopts technology. The lower
threshold suggests the rejection of the technology. McCardle shows that it
is optimal for the ﬁrm to continue to collect information until its estimate of
proﬁtability crosses one of two thresholds. Crossing the upper threshold the92 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
ﬁrm will adopt technology while it will reject if the lower threshold is crossed.
He ﬁnds that even ﬁrms that behave optimally will occasionally adopt un-
proﬁtable technologies and reject proﬁtable ones.
Doraszelski (2004) distinguishes between generation of a new technology
and its further improvement and assumes that the occurrence of the next im-
provement depends on the time elapsed since the previous innovation. Do-
raszelski concludes that the ﬁrm may have an incentive to delay adoption of
a new technology until it is sufﬁciently advanced. Also Alvarez and Sten-
backa (2001) introduce a model dealing with the possibility to improve the
incumbent technology. They study the optimal time to adopt an incumbent
technology, incorporating as an embedded option a technologically uncertain
prospect of opportunities for updating the technology in response to the emer-
gence of future superior versions of the technology. They derive the optimal
adoption timing facing technological uncertainty in combination with uncer-
tainty of future market conditions.
Empirical econometric work on technology adoption goes back to the 1950s
with Griliches (1957). Our approach to extend the technology adoption liter-
ature is closest related to Farzin et al. (1998) and Huisman (2000). Huisman
(2001) introduced an approach to technology adoption timing decisions in a
real options context and extended the traditional decision theoretic models on
technology adoption with a model in which the technologies arrive according
to a Poisson process. We brieﬂy explain Huisman’s basic model, which forms
the starting point for our work, in Section 3.1. Huisman studies the optimal
time to irreversibly switch to a new technology when the value and the arrival
date of future improvements are uncertain. Technology advances according
to a compound Poisson process with constant arrival rate. As in Huisman we
model the technological process with a Poisson process but assume that the
arrival rate changes.
Two recent papers dealing with technology adoption are Kwon (2010) and
Cho and McCardle (2009). Kwon (2010) focuses upon investment and exit de-
cisions of a ﬁrm facing a declining proﬁt stream. The ﬁrm can continue opera-
tion, exit or use the one time option to undertake an investment that boosts the
project’s proﬁt rate. This leads to the results that in case of a sufﬁciently large
proﬁtboostuponinvestment, thisinvestmentthresholddecreasesinvolatility.
Cho and McCardle (2009) investigate the role of economic and stochastic
technological dependence on the adoption of multiple type of new technolo-
gies. They show that the dependence among different types of technologies
has a material impact on a ﬁrm’s adoption decisions. This impact is not uni-CHAPTER 4 93
directional, it can either delay or expedite the adoption of an improved tech-
nology.
While we model the technological innovation progress with a stationary
stochastic process, literature on learning in the ﬁnancing of innovation shows
a current modeling approach with non stationary models. An example for
this approach is Bergemann et al. (2009) that consider the innovation process
from the point of view of investors that provide the ﬁnancing for a project.
They analyze how investors make optimal dynamic investment decisions as a
functionoftheirinformationaboutfailureriskandpotentialﬁnalvalue. While
a larger investment ﬂow into the project promises faster success, it is likely to
reduce the efﬁciency of the investment. The investors can inﬂuence the speed
which with a project is developed. There is uncertainty present about the true
value of the project which is resolved over time. The uncertainty about the
likelihood of the project’s success is modeled by a non-stationary process.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Constant Arrival Probability
In the following we brieﬂy present the technology arrival model with con-
stant arrival rate as presented by Huisman (2001, Chapter 2, single switch
case). Huisman(2001)considersarisk-neutralﬁrm, whoseproﬁtﬂowisdeter-
mined by its own technology choice. P(q) denotes the proﬁt function which
is increasing in the technology level, i.e. ¶P
¶q > 0. The ﬁrm maximizes its
value over an inﬁnite planning horizon. The discount rate r is assumed to be
constant. At the beginning of the planning horizon the ﬁrm produces with a
technology whose efﬁciency equals x0( 0). xt denotes the efﬁciency level of
the technology that the ﬁrm uses at time t (t  0). As time passes new and
more efﬁcient technologies are invented. qt denotes the efﬁciency level of the
most efﬁcient technology available at this time t. This means that qt   x0 de-
notes the highest possible improvement in technological efﬁciency available





0 w.p. (1  ldt),
(4.1)
with l assumed to be constant. As in Huisman (2001) we will also assume
in the following that the ﬁrm can not inﬂuence the innovation itself, i.e. it is94 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
assumed exogenous to the ﬁrm. Concerning the size of the jump we assume
it to be constant for the moment.
The ﬁrm can adopt a new technology by paying a sunk cost I(> 0). The
problem addressed concerns the timing of the ﬁrm’s technology switch. The
ﬁrm faces an optimal stopping problem, where stopping means that the ﬁrm
invests and thus adopts a new technology and continuation resembles waiting
with investing. As shown in Huisman (2001) there is a unique value of qt
for which the ﬁrm is indifferent between investing and waiting. In order to
derive this threshold q one needs to derive the termination as well as the
continuation payoff. The termination payoff is given by the ﬁrm’s value at the








The continuation region can (given that the jump size u is constant) be split
into two parts. In the ﬁrst part investing is not optimal even after the next
jump, i.e. fqjq < q   ug, while in the second part investing is optimal after
the next jump, i.e. fqjq   u  q < qg. Given x0 and qt = q the value of the
















r if q < q   u,
P(x0)
r+l + l
r+lV(q + u) if q   u  q < q,
V(q) if q  q.
(4.3)
The critical investment level q is found by solving the value matching condi-







V(q + u). (4.4)
At the threshold q the ﬁrm is indifferent between investing right away (see
left-hand side of equation (4.4)) and investing after the next technology arrival
(see right-hand side of equation (4.4)). The value matching condition ensures
the continuity of the value function at this point.
The following proposition shows that for the model with constant arrival
rate the adoption threshold is increasing in the arrival rate l for concave proﬁt
ﬂow functions. This result is supported numerically in Huisman (2001). We
provide the analytical proof for it (see Appendix B).
Proposition 1 For concave proﬁt function, the optimal adoption threshold is in-
creasing in the arrival rate, i.e., if q(l) denotes the threshold when the arrival rateCHAPTER 4 95
is l then for l1 < l2 it follows that:
q(l1) < q(l2). (4.5)
4.3.2 Changing Arrival Rate
This work extends the constant arrival rate model assuming that the arrival
rate of new technology changes, i.e. l in equation (4.1) is not constant. We
assume that right after a technology arrival has happened the arrival rate is
equal to l1. If no arrival should happen for a time period of length D the
arrival rate changes to l2. l2 is assumed to be strictly positive. We denote X
as the time between consecutive technology arrivals:
X  Exp(l1)1fX<Dg + (D + Exp(l2))1fXDg, (4.6)
where 1fAg is equal to one if A is true. D is set to be constant for the moment.
In Section 4.5 we will extend the presented model assuming random D. This
approach allows us to model a range of practical problems we had in mind,
for example the characteristics in technological innovation process in the CPU
transistor industry or the product release strategy of an electronics company,
while maintaining still a certain degree of analytical tractability of the prob-
lem.
As X denotes the random variable corresponding to the time elapsed be-
































2   (l1   l2)2
+2eDl1l1(l1   l2)(1+ Dl2)

for l1 > 0.
(4.8)
For a more detailed explanation of the derivation of this expressions we refer
to Appendix A.
In case of changing arrival rate we have to distinguish the two cases, X < D
and X  D. For matter of clearness we refer to these two cases as ’region 1’
and ’region 2’. The fact that there are two regions formally means that we
have a mixture of processes (one with rate l1 and another with rate l2), with96 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the two processes
corresponding probability-weights
R D
0 e rxl1e l1xdx = 1 e (r+l1)D (the dis-
counted probability that an arrival takes place before time D, meaning that we
are in region 1) and e (r+l1)D (the discounted probability that there is no ar-
rival in region 1). For the case of the process with arrival rate l1, the decision
about the investment takes place at time t = 0; remark that this is exactly the
constant arrival model as in Huisman (2001). Due to the constant investment
cost, the exponential interarrival times, and due to discounting, the ﬁrm will
adopt the technology only at the moment of arrival of new technology. For the
process with rate l2 the reasoning is similar; but in this case the decisions can
just be taken after a time period D, as what happens before D is not taken into
account. Due to the lack of memory of the exponential distribution, the fact
that only what happens after time D is taken into account, does not change the
probabilistic structure of the process. And thus it can also be addressed as the
constant arrival model, with an additional waiting period of length D before
any arrival is possible.
Deriving the optimal investment moment, both processes have to be taken
intoaccountandthereforetheoptimalinvestmentthresholdsforeachofthem.
In the following we will denote the process with arrival rate l1 as ’process 1’
and therefore denote the corresponding investment threshold with q
1. Sim-
ilarly q
2 will denote the optimal investment threshold for process 2 (i.e. the
process with arrival rate l2 and waiting period of D). Figure 1 illustrates the
difference of the two processes and their corresponding investment thresh-
olds.CHAPTER 4 97
The following proposition provides equations that implicitly determine the
technology adoption thresholds q
i for both processes (i = 1,2).
Proposition 2 For the derivation of the optimal technology adoption thresholds for
process 1, the following holds:
1. If l1 < l2, the optimal adoption threshold for process 1, i.e. q
1, is implicitly
















2. If l1 > l2, the optimal adoption threshold q
1, is implicitly deﬁned as the solu-

























The optimal adoption threshold for process 2, i.e. q















2 + u) otherwise,
(4.11)





















and M(q) = d
q
1 q
u e, with the convention that å
 1
0 ... = 0.
Generally the optimal investment threshold q for the model with constant
arrival rate is given by the trigger at which the value of immediate investment
isequaltothevalueofinvestmentafterthenexttechnologyarrival(forfurther
explanations see Huisman (2001)). The same procedure can be applied to de-
rive the optimal investment threshold in region 1. One has to ﬁnd the optimal
q
1 where the ﬁrm is indifferent between investing immediately and investing98 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
after the next arrival. The left hand side of equations (4.9) and (4.10) describes
the value of immediate investment, i.e. the value of the ﬁrm when it produces
with technology x = q
1 forever minus the investment cost (according to equa-
tion (4.2) or the constant arrival rate model). The right hand side consists of
two terms. The ﬁrst term corresponds to the proﬁt gained by investing just





The second term describes the proﬁt gained in case there is no arrival in re-
gion 1. Here we have to distinguish the following two cases: First, if there is
no arrival in region 2 there is no further possibility to invest and therefore the
ﬁrm has to continue producing with the current technology level. In case an
arrival happens in region 2, which constitutes the second case, the ﬁrm will
immediately invest in the new technology at the moment of arrival and there-
fore the discounted proﬁt of producing with this technology forever is added
to the ﬁrm’s value.
Deriving the threshold for region 2, one has to look for the optimal trig-
ger q
2 where the ﬁrm is indifferent between investing D time units after the
previous technology arrival and investing after the next arrival. One has to
differentiate here between the following two cases: In case q
1  q
2 + u the
ﬁrm will invest right after the next arrival happened in region 2. The ﬁrst line
of equation (4.11) summarizes this case. Otherwise, the ﬁrm will invest as
soon as region 2 is reached again (see the second line of equation (4.11)). In
this case one has to take into account two scenarios:
1. Region 2 will not be reached because it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest
before in region 1. This happens if the following M(q) arrivals take place








2. Region 2 will be reached because there are at most (M(q)   1) arrivals
happening in region 1 before region 2 is reached again. The probabil-
ity of reaching region 2 is equal to e (r+l1)D. The term (1   e (r+l1)D)n
describes the probability that there are n arrivals in region 1. The sec-
ond term of function G(q) includes all possible repetitions of arrivals in
region 1 before region 2 is entered.
The following proposition describes the optimal investment strategy of the
ﬁrm considering the two thresholds speciﬁed by Proposition 2:
Proposition 3 For the optimal investment strategy the ﬁrm considers two differ-
ent scenarios:CHAPTER 4 99
1. If l1 < l2, threshold q
1 is the solution of equation (4.9). The ﬁrm does not
consider threshold q
2 because threshold q
1 will always be reached ﬁrst.
2. If l1 > l2, threshold q
1 is the solution of equation (4.10). q
2 is given by the
admissible solution of equation (4.11). Considering both thresholds, the ﬁrm
will invest as soon as
(a) it is in region 2 and has reached q
2 or
(b) it is in region 1 having reached q
1.
The relation of the two arrival rate parameters l1 and l2 directly speciﬁes
the relation of the two thresholds in region 1 and region 2 as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 If l1 > l2 then the following relation between the two thresholds
of region 1 and region 2, respectively, holds: q
1 > q
2, with q
1 implicitly given by
equation (4.10).
The following corollary states that according to the optimal investment
strategy it is possible that there occurs a time lag between a new technology
innovation and its adoption.
Corollary 1 If l2 < l1 (i.e. for the optimal investment strategy both thresholds
need to be considered) it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest D time units after the last
technology innovation if the actual technology level has increased up to level q
2 and
D time units have elapsed since the last innovation without having reached threshold
q
1 yet.
4.3.3 Expected Time of Technology Adoption
Knowing the optimal adoption triggers we will derive the expected value of
the adoption time T. For reasons of comparison of the models with constant
arrival rate and changing arrival rate we ﬁrst state the expected time of adop-






Then it follows that T is just the sum of n(q) i.i.d. exponential random vari-





where q? is the optimal investment level derived as solution of equation (4.4).100 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
For the model with changing arrival rate, let M denote an integer value,
and let E[t](M) denote the expected time of adoption given that M jumps
occurred before the adoption of the new technology. Remark that these M
jumps can occur as a combination of jumps when the arrival rate is l1 and
l2; in the ﬁrst case the expected time between consecutive arrivals is 1/l1,















+ (M   n)D

[P(X < D)]
n [P(X > D)]
M n , (4.14)
where X is the time elapsed between consecutive arrivals, so that
P(X < D) = 1  e l1D.
The following proposition gives expressions for the expected value of T as-
suming a changing arrival rate for innovation. The proof is given in Appendix
B.
Proposition 5 Let n(q) = d
q q0
u e, that is the number of steps necessary to reach
an adoption threshold q starting at current technology level q0. Concerning the ex-
pected time of adoption we have the following results:
 Case 1: If l1  l2 the ﬁrm will just consider adoption of a new technology im-
mediately after a technology arrival happens, i.e. it just considers q
1. Therefore,
the expected time of adoption is given by the expected time of n(q) = d
q q0
u e
technology arrivals to happen, which is given by
IE[T] = E[t](n(q
1)). (4.15)
 Case 2: If l1 > l2 the ﬁrm will either invest as soon as investment threshold
q
1 is reached or at the moment that threshold q
2 is reached and region 2 has
been entered again, i.e. D has passed since the last technology arrival. For this
case the expected time of technology adoption is given by expected time to reach
threshold q
2 plus the expected time to either reach threshold q
1 or enter region
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In this section we analyze the optimal adoption strategy of a ﬁrm consider-
ing changing arrival rate and compare the results to the adoption strategy in
case the arrival rate is constant. We will consider two speciﬁc applications
of the model and analyze numerical examples suited to those. The applica-
tions relate to the cases of l1 > l2 and l1 < l2, respectively. In order to
compare the model with changing arrival rate to the one with constant arrival
rate in a meaningful way, we choose the parameter values in such a way that
the expected time between two consecutive technology arrivals is equal for















for l1 > 0.
(4.18)
The derivation of the expected value of the time between two consecutive
arrivals for both models is shown in Appendix A.1.
First, we consider the case of l1 > l2: This means that the arrival rate of
new technology is assumed to decrease if a speciﬁc time period D has passed
without any new arrival taking place. As shown in Proposition 4 we know
that if l1 > l2 the threshold in region 1 is lower than the threshold of region
2. This means that the probability that the ﬁrm adopts a new technology a
time lag after its release is strictly positive. That is consistent with the fact that
ﬁrms in practice often adopt a new technology a time lag after its introduction.
4.4.1 Example 1
In the following we will present an application for the case of l1 > l2, and
analyze the effect of several parameters on the derived investment strategy.
The application we have in mind deals with the statement of Moore’s law that
describes a long-term trend in the history of computing hardware. It sug-
gests that “the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an
integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. This trend has con-102 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
tinued for more than half a century and is expected to continue until 2015,
2020 or later”3 when the possibilities of further improvement are exhausted.
Wewillshowonthebasisofthefollowingnumericalexamplethattheprob-
ability that a ﬁrm will adopt a new innovation with a time lag between inno-
vation and adoption can be substantially high in case the arrival rate in region
1 is higher than the arrival rate in region 2, i.e. l1 > l2. Inspired by the
statement of Moore’s law and the characteristics in technological innovation
process in the CPU transistor sector we introduce the following example:
EXAMPLE 1. We assume that on average an innovation takes place every
two years, i.e. IE[X] = 2. D is equal to 3. The arrival rate in region 1, l1, ranges
from 1.0, 1.1 to 1.5 with l2 aligned so that IE[X] is for all cases equal to 2. The
investment costs for new technology are equal to I = 500. The step size with
which the technology process increases by technology arrival is given with
u = 0.5. In order to model the fact that a new innovation doubles the efﬁ-
ciency of technology (for example the number of transistors that can be placed
on an integrated circuit considering the example of computing hardware) we
choose a proﬁt function that approximately doubles per step of improvement
in technology efﬁciency. We choose the proﬁt function P(q) = jqb4, with
j = 1000 and b = 2. The other parameters are r = 0.1, q0 = 1 and an arrival
rate of l = 0.5 for the standard model. For a graphical illustration of transistor
counts improvements from 1971-2011 see Figure 4.2.
Wesolvefortheoptimalinvestmentstrategyusingthechangingarrivalrate
model as well as the constant arrival rate model. The result of Proposition 2
is based on the fact that the adoption threshold for the standard model with
constant arrival rate, is increasing in the arrival rate. We proved this for con-
cave proﬁt functions (see Proposition 1). However, for Example 1 we choose a
convex proﬁt function of the form jq2. Therefore, it remains to show that the
statement in Proposition 1 is also valid for this speciﬁc convex proﬁt function.
This is the content of the following proposition. The proof can be found in the
Appendix. Therewith, the statement of Proposition 2 that explicitly speciﬁes
the two cases l1 < l2 and l1 > l2 is also valid for convex proﬁt functions of
the form P(q) = jq2.
Proposition 6 For a given proﬁt function of the form P(q) = jq2, the optimal
3We refer to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore’s_law for this statement.
4Here we choose the same proﬁt function as considered in Farzin et al. (1998). The ﬁrm’s
production function is given by h(v,x) = xva, where v( 0) is a variable input, x( 0) is the
efﬁciency parameter, and a 2 (0,1) is the constant output elasticity. The output and input
price are constant and equal to p and w. The proﬁt ﬂow equals p(x) = maxv (pxva   wv).






1 a and b = 1
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Figure 4.2: Graphical Illustration of Microprocessor Transistor Counts
from 1971-2011: Transistor counts for integrated circuits
are plotted against their dates of introduction. The curve
shows that the transistor counts double approximately
every two years.
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Transistor_Count_
and_Moore%27s_Law_-_2008.svg )104 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
adoption threshold is increasing in the arrival rate, i.e., if q(l) denotes the threshold
when the arrival rate is l, then for l1 < l2 it follows that:
q(l1) < q(l2). (4.19)
The standard model assumes that the arrival rate of new technology is
equal to l forever. This assumption ignores that at some point all possibilities
for further improvements are likely to be exhausted and further improvement
isnotpossible. Weaccountforthisphenomenonandallowthatthearrivalrate
can decrease to a value close to zero in case the last arrival dates back long in-
dicating that the natural boundary of the innovation process is reached. For
our speciﬁc example we assume that in case three time periods have passed
without a new arrival the arrival rate drops from l1 = (0.8, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5 or
1.75) to l2 = (0.1051, 0.0474, 0.0193, 0.0083 or 0.0037). The numerical results
of Example 1 are presented in Table 4.1. Recall that for the case of l1 > l2
there is a positive probability that the ﬁrm adopts new technology a time lag
after its arrival. The expression for the probability that the ﬁrm will invest a
time lag after the innovation at q
2, is content for Proposition 7. Proposition 7
also states the expression of the expected number of jumps before technology
adoption.
Proposition 7 If l1 > l2, the probability that the ﬁrm will adopt new technology
at a level of q such that q 2 [q
2,q
2 + u), assuming a current adopted technology
value of x0, is 2 [1   (1   e l1D)m 1,1   (1   e l1D)m





The expected number of jumps before technology adoption is given by
IE[n] = n(q




where n(q) denotes the number of jumps necessary to reach the technology level q
when the ﬁrm’s currently used technology level is equal q0. P(adopt at q
2) denotes
the probability that the ﬁrm adopts technology a time lag after its innovation at the
threshold q
2.
A crucial advantage to the standard model is that we can explain a possible
time lag between innovation and adoption. In case that l1 > l2 the proba-
bility of a time lag between innovation and adoption is strictly positive and it
can be substantially high as the results of Example 1 illustrate. For the case of
l1 = 0.8 and l2 = 0.1051, the ﬁrm will adopt new technology a time lag of
D = 3 after the technology innovation with a probability of more than 31%.
Another advantage of the extended model is that we gain an additional
degree of freedom. It allows to show the effect of increasing variance or stan-
dard deviation, respectively, of time between two consecutive technology ar-
rivals on the optimal adoption strategy while keeping the expected time ﬁxedCHAPTER 4 105
Table 4.1: Effect of increasing variance between two consecutive ar-
rivals on the optimal adoption strategy, keeping the ex-
pected time between consecutive arrivals ﬁxed to IE[X] = 2
by increasing l1 and decreasing l2. (Parameter values:
D = 3.0, r = 0.1, u = 0.5, q0 = 1, I = 500, b = 2.0 and
j = 1000. Pq
2:=Prob(investing at q
2))
l1 = 0.8 l1 = 1.0 l1 = 1.25 l1 = 1.5 l1 = 1.75
l2 = 0.105 l2 = 0.047 l2 = 0.019 l2 = 0.008 l2 = 0.004
q
1 6.72 8.25 10.78 13.69 16.67
q
2 4.48 4.2 3.89 3.65 3.47
IE[T] 21.78 23.18 22.69 25.24 24.82
std[X] 4.45 6.94 11.44 18.13 28.04
Pq
2  31.64% 33.54% 26.61% 20.02% 12.79%
IE[n] 10.42 12.32 16.28 22 28.55
(in our numerical example IE[X] = 2). Table 4.1 focuses on the effect of in-
creasing standard deviation on the optimal adoption timing, presenting all
relevant values of the optimal adoption strategy for increasing standard devi-
ation (std[X] = 4.45, 6.94, 11.44, 18.13 and 28.04). We ﬁnd that an increase in
the standard deviation decreases the probability of a time lag between innova-
tion and adoption to 12.79%. We increase the standard deviation keeping the
expected value ﬁxed by increasing the arrival rate in region 1 while decreas-
ing the arrival rate in region 2. This leads to a lower probability of ending
up in region 2 (i.e. no arrival in region 1 within D time periods) and there-
fore, the probability of a time lag between innovation and adoption decreases
(see Table 4.1). This is, on the one hand due to the fact that an increasing l1
lowers the chance that region 2 will be reached. On the other hand, lower l2
makes an arrival in region 2 more unlikely. The amount of arrivals necessary
to reach the adoption threshold, increases with standard deviation. While for
a standard deviation of std[X] = 6.94 11 technology arrivals are necessary to
reach the adoption threshold, the amount of necessary technology arrivals in-
creases to 29 if the standard deviation increases to std[X] = 28.04. The effect
of increasing variance on the expected time of arrival is non-monotonic.106 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
Table 4.2: Effect of increasing variance between two consecutive ar-
rivals, keeping the expected arrival time between consecu-
tive arrivals ﬁxed to IE[X] = 2 by increasing D and decreas-
ing l2. (Parameter values: l1 = 1.0, r = 0.1, u = 0.5, q0 = 1,
I = 500, b = 2.0 and j = 1000). Pq
2:=Prob(investing at q
2))
D = 3 D = 4 D = 5 D = 6
l2 = 0.0474 l2 = 0.01799 l2 = 0.00669 l2 = 0.00247
q
1 8.25 9.33 9.94 10.2
q
2 4.20 3.66 3.37 3.25
IE[T] 23.19 23.9 23.93 24.02
IE[X] 2 2 2 2
Var[X] 48.2 119.2 308.83 820.86
std[X] 6.94 10.92 17.57 28.65
Pq
2  33.54% 18.4% 8.41% 3.18%
IE[n] 12.32 14.98 16.91 18.56
4.4.2 Example 2
The second application deals with technological innovations in the electron-
ics sector and customers’ buying behavior. We look at a technology adoption
problem from the point of view of a single consumer that will decide when it
is optimal to buy a new version of an electronic product. While consumers as
a group can have inﬂuence on the technological progress, i.e. for example Ap-
ple’s product release schedule, a single consumer’s actions do not inﬂuence
this progress. The technology progress therefore is exogenous to an individ-
ual consumer. However, he might have certain expectations about the arrival
of new product series. Many companies in the electronics sector present new
series of their product lines regularly. If Apple has just released a new line
of its iPod or iPad series, consumers expect that the chance of a new release
is very unlikely for a speciﬁc period of time, depending on Apple’s previous
release schedules. If Apple used to release a new iPod generation once per
year, consumers think that a new update is very likely in case one year has
passed after the last release already. For a graphical illustration of the steady
iPod-product release schedule of Apple see Figure 4.3. Example 2 addresses
the technology investment strategy of a consumer that decides about the op-
timal moment to purchase the next generation of an electronic product. TheCHAPTER 4 107
Figure 4.3: Illustration of iPod release schedule of Apple
consumer assumes that a new product generation is released on average ev-
ery two years. We raise the question of how the consumer’s optimal adoption
timing of a new product line depends on his expectation about a companies
product release schedule.
Example 2 The arrival rate in region 2 is assumed to be l2 = 1, while the
arrival rate in region 1 is small l1 = 0.05 . The expected time between two
consecutive product releases is equal to E[X] = 1.93. The other parameters
are: b = 1, q0 = 1, u = 0.5, r = 0.1 and I = 500.
Tables 4.3 presents numerical results for Example 2. The optimal adoption
thresholds of Example 2 are q
1 = 1.3 for region 1 and q
2 = 15.05 for region
2. Since q
1 < q
2, the ﬁrm will always adopt new technology at the moment
of innovation. This conﬁrms what is observed in practice. Consumers do not
buy a product of the old series when expecting a new release soon. Further-
more, our results show that there is no time lag effect. This ﬁnding explains
the fact that companies are forced to reduce prices of old product generations
when announcing a new one. Since there is no time lag effect, ﬁrms need to
drop prices of the old product generation in order to increase their sales of the
old product generation to empty their inventories. After Apple announced
the release of iPad2 on March 2 2011 (release in U.S. on March 11 2011), they
dropped the price of the old generation iPad 1 immediately by 20% in order
to unload the remaining inventory of the table computer’s ﬁrst generation5.
Table 4.3 shows the effect of increasing variance Var[X] on the optimal
adoption strategy. It shows that the investment threshold q
1 as well as ex-
5See for example article in CNN Tech (http : //articles.cnn.com/2011   03  
03/tech/ipad.1.price_1_ipad   16gb   wi   fi   64gb?_s = PM : TECH) from March 3, 2011.108 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
Table 4.3: Optimal adoption strategy and the effect of changing vari-
ance. (Parameter values: IE[X] = 1.93, D = 1, u = 0.5,
r = 0.1, q0 = 1, I = 500, b = 1.0 and j = 1000).
l1 l2 Var[X] std[X] q
1 q
2 IE[T] E[n]
0.01 1.063 0.89796 0.95 1.1 15.37 2.91 1
0.05 1 1.06026 1.03 1.3 15.05 2.88 1
0.1 0.928 1.27512 1.13 1.55 14.69 5.66 2
pected time of adoption IE[T] is increasing in variance. While for variance
equal to Var[X] = 0.898 the expected time of adoption is equal to 2.91, in-
creasing variance to 1.28, keeping the expected time equal to 1.93, causes the
expected time of adoption to increase to 5.66. This is in line with the standard
real options result that increasing uncertainty postpones investment. For the
standard case an expected interarrival time of IE[X] = 1.93 results from a con-
stant arrival rate equal to l = 0.52. The related investment threshold is equal
to q = 3.64 and the expected time of adoption IE[T] = 6. The threshold
derived for the constant arrival model is higher than for the changing arrival
rate model. This is driven by the fact that the variance of time between two
consecutive arrivals is higher for the standard case model (Var[x] = 3.73) than
for the case of changing arrival rate with low l1.
With its product release strategy, Apple sends clear signals to their cus-
tomers by regular steady releases of new product generations which theo-
retically speaking decreases the variance of time between arrivals from their
customers’ point of view and therefore uncertainty. Evaluating this product
release strategy, we can conﬁrm that it is successful in the sense of accelerating
customers’ purchases of new product generations.
4.5 Model Extension
So far we have assumed that the time period after which the value of the ar-
rival rate changes in case no arrival happened before is constant and known.
In the following we will release that assumption including an additional de-
gree of uncertainty to the problem. Speciﬁcally we assume that the moment
at which the arrival rate changes is uncertain introducing stochastic D that is
exponentially distributed.CHAPTER 4 109
We assume that D is exponentially distributed, i.e. D  Exp(m). This means
that at time t the ﬁrm knows in which regime it is but it does not know when
the value of l changes. And therefore, the expected time between two consec-
utive arrivals is given (in view of equation (4.7)) by
























for l1 > 0.
(4.21)
The variance of time between two consecutive arrivals assuming exponen-













m2 for l1 = 0.
(4.22)
The derivation of this expression is shown in Appendix A. For the case of
exponentiallydistributed D thefollowingpropositionstatestheequationsthat
implicitly determine the thresholds q
1 and q
2:
Proposition 8 For the derivation of the optimal technology adoption thresholds
for process 1, the following two cases have to be distinguished:
1. If l1 < l2, the optimal adoption threshold for process 1, i.e. q
1, is implicitly






















2. If l1 > l2, the optimal adoption threshold q
1, is implicitly deﬁned as the solu-





























The optimal adoption threshold for process 2, i.e. q
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and M(q) = d
q
1 q
u e, with the convention that å
 1
0 ... = 0.
We state the expression of the expected time of technology adoption as well
as its derivation in Appendix A.
In the following we will analyze the effect of stochastic D on the optimal
adoption timing for the case of l1 < l2. In case l1 > l2 the optimal adop-
tion time only depends on the threshold of region 1, that is independent of
D, and therefore it is not inﬂuenced by the extension to this additional un-
certainty of the problem. We concentrate on the case where the arrival rate
decreases after a certain period of time has passed with any new arrival, i.e.
l1 > l2. We consider Example 1 introduced in the previous section assuming
exponentially distributed D with parameter m = 1
3, i.e. D  Exp(1
3). That
means that in expectation D is equal to 3 as in the non-stochastic case. The nu-
merical results are presented in Table 4.4. It shows that additional uncertainty
about the moment that the arrival rate decreases from l1 to l2 accelerates the
ﬁrm’s investment. The ﬁrm threatened that the arrival rate changes to a low
value making a new arrival and therefore improvement in the recent technol-
ogy very unlikely, is investing earlier than in the case where it is aware of the
moment of change. The result that increasing uncertainty accelerates invest-
mentisoppositetothestandardrealoptionsresultsandarisesfromaproperty
of the exponential distribution. Assuming that D is exponentially distributed
with an expected value of 3 implies that an arrival of D before the expected
value IE[D] = 3 is more likely than after and therefore, the ﬁrm is threatened
by an early decrease in arrival rate which makes it invest earlier.
4.6 Conclusion
We extend the literature on technology adoption by assuming that the arrival
rate of new technologies is not constant but changes. The arrival rate changes
in case no new technology arrives within a certain time period after the last
innovation. We explain the economic fact that ﬁrms sometimes adopt new
technology a time lag after its innovation. Our analysis shows that the prob-
ability that a ﬁrm adopts a new technology a time lag after its innovation isCHAPTER 4 111
Table 4.4: Effect of increasing variance between two consecutive ar-
rivals on the optimal adoption strategy, keeping the ex-
pected time between consecutive arrivals ﬁxed to IE[X] = 2
by increasing l1 and decreasing l2. (Parameter values:
D = 3.0, r = 0.1, u = 0.5, q0 = 1, I = 500, b = 2.0 and
j = 1000).
l1 = 0.8 l1 = 1.0 l1 = 1.25 l1 = 1.5 l1 = 1.75
l2 = 0.105 l2 = 0.047 l2 = 0.019 l2 = 0.008 l2 = 0.004
q
1 4.17 3.88 3.92 4.21 4.63
q
2 3.78 3.44 3.34 3.25 3.22
IE[T] 16.08 12.5 14.02 13.12 14.93
Var[X] 46 195 1012 4799 21858.
std[X] 14.3513 13.98 31.81 69.27 147.84
E[X] 6.8 6.02 11.54 22.45 44.08
strictly positive in case the arrival rate would drop after a certain time period
without any new arrival. If the ﬁrm expects the arrival rate to rise, this time
lag effect is not present.
We analyze the effect of variance of time between two consecutive arrivals
on the adoption decision and ﬁnd that increasing variance postpones invest-
ment in case the arrival rate would drop after a certain period without any
arrival. In case the arrival rate is supposed to rise, increasing variance affects
the adoption timing in a non-monotonic way.
In a further step, we assume that the moment at which the arrival rate
switches is not known beforehand, but uncertain. We ﬁnd the that increas-
ing uncertainty accelerates investment, which is opposite to the standard real
options result that a ﬁrm facing higher uncertainty waits longer with invest-
ment.
Allowing for multiple technology adoptions, changing step size or time
dependent investment costs could be interesting extensions for further re-
search. We assume that the arrival rate of new technology can take two dif-
ferent values. At a speciﬁc period after the last arrival took place, the arrival
rate switches from one value to the other. An interesting approach for fur-
ther research would be to assume that the arrival rate is a smooth increas-
ing/decreasing function of time, which would mean that the longer the last112 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
technology arrival dates back the higher/lower is the probability of a new ar-
rival. Considering the electronics industry it would be also very appealing to
include the fact that once a company introduces a new product, other com-
panies are under pressure to introduce new products as well. When Parm,
Inc. introduced the ﬁrst smartphone to be deployed in widespread use in
the United States, in the early 2011, Microsoft announced the “Microsoft Win-
dows Powered” smartphone the end that year. In 2002 Handspring released
the “Palm OS Treo” smartphone and RIM followed with the release of the ﬁrst
“BlackBerry” devices. One could employ a different model based on mutu-
ally exciting jump processes, known as Hawkes processes, which capture that
each event generated by the process in turn generates a sequence of offspring
events according to a Poisson distribution.CHAPTER 4 113
4.A Appendix
Additional Model Details
In the Appendix we will refer to the model with constant arrival rate as model
(i) and to the extended model with changing arrival rate as model (ii).
Time between Consecutive Arrivals
In the following we derive the expectation and variance of the time between
consecutive technology arrivals for both models. X denotes the random vari-
ablecorrespondingtothetimeelapsedbetweenconsecutivearrivalsformodel
(ii) and Z denotes the time elapsed between consecutive arrivals for model (i).
In both cases the technology level process, fq(t),t  0g, is a linear transfor-
mation of a Poisson process
q(t) = q(0) + N(t)u, (4.27)
where N(t) denotes the number of new technology arrivals up to time t. Note
that in model (i) fN(t),t  0g is a Poisson process with rate l, whereas in
model (ii) fN(t),t  0g is a non-homogeneous Poisson process. In both cases
one can derive the expected value of time between consecutive arrivals as
follows:
For model (i), as we are in presence of a homogeneous Poisson process
with rate l, the expected time between consecutive arrivals of information
concerning new technology is simply IE[Z] = 1
l and the variance is Var[Z] =
1
l2.
For model (ii) we have to distinguish two cases. Let us ﬁrst assume that l1
is strictly positive (l1 > 0). As




P(Poi(l1t) = k) for t < D,
P(Poi(l1D) + Poi(l2(t   D)) = k) for D < t,
where Poi(tl) denotes that N(t) is Poisson distributed with parameter lt, and
assuming independence of these two Poisson distributions, it follows that
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Substituting equations (4.30) and (4.32) in Var[X] = IE[X2]   IE2[X] leads the
expression for the variance shown in equation (4.8).
Now assume that l1 = 0. Then X = D + Y with Y  Exp(l2), where
the previous equality is to be read as with probability one. Thus the expected
value is given by










Time between Consecutive Arrivals for extension of stochastic D
In order to derive the variance of time between two consecutive technology
arrivals we use the fact that V[X] = E[Var[X]jD] + Var[E[XjD]] deriving ex-
pression E[Var[X]jD] and Var[E[XjD]], separately. For the case l1 > 0, we ﬁrst
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Adding the two expressions up and simplifying results in equation (4.22).








Expected time of Adoption for extension of stochastic D
Now for the expected time of technology adoption: we use again the fact that
E[t?] = E[E[t?jD]], and thus we may use the expressions for E[t?] derived in
the previous section. Therefore, we end up with the following result:
 Case 1: q
1  q
2 In this case the ﬁrm will just consider adoption of new tech-
nology immediately after a technology arrival happens, without entering region
2. Thus, similarly to the case of ﬁxed and deterministic D,
IE[T] = E[t](n(q
1)). (4.41)116 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
 Case 2: q
1 > q


































Proof of Proposition 1
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q=q
= 0. (4.45)
We want to show that the investment threshold q is increasing in l, i.e. ¶q
¶l 





























(r + l)2 (P(q0)   P(q + u) + rI). (4.48)
Since
P(q)
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¶l to be positive we need to show that
¶F(q,l)
¶q  0. For a concave
proﬁt function P(.) it holds that
¶2P(.)
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Proof of Proposition 2













r+sV( + u) (i.e. case of constant arrival rate with
arrival rate s), and c computed accordingly. This means that q
1 is either equal
to the optimal level of the standard case with constant arrival rate l1, or it is
a solution of an equation involving a linear combination of values Vl1() and
Vl2().
Now assume that l1 < l2. Then, in view of the monotonicity of the op-
timal level in terms of the intensity rate of the Poisson process (see Propo-
sition 4), we know that q?(l1) < q?(l2), with q(l) denoting the optimal
level in the standard case with constant arrival rate l. Thus it follows triv-
ially, that Vl1(q) < Vl2(q). As a linear combination is always between the
smallest and the largest values of the combination, we have cVl1(q
1) + (1  
c)Vl2(q
1) > Vl1(q
1). Thus the threshold (q
1) computed by means of the upper
expression for equation (4.50) presents the smallest optimal adoption trigger
for the case l1 < l2.
Using similar arguments, we conclude that q
1 should be computed by the
























if l1 > l2.
(4.51)
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that l1 > l2. In that case q
1 is the solution of equation (4.10). q
2
is the solution of the upper part of equation (4.11) if q
1  q
2 + u, otherwise
it is the solution of the lower part of equation (4.11). In case of the latter, i.e.
q
1 > q
2 +u, itisalreadyimplicitlyassumedthat q
1 > q
2. Therefore, itremains
to prove that the solution for q
2 of the upper part of equation (4.11) is smaller
than the threshold q




i;std denote the optimal adoption threshold for the standard case with
constant arrival rate li. The solution of the upper branch of equation (4.11)
gives exactly q?
2;std, i.e. in this case it holds q?
2 = q?
2;std. On the other hand,118 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
the right part of equation (4.10) is a linear convex combination of Vl1(q?
1) and
Vl2(q?
1). (For the speciﬁcation of the function Vs(.) see Proof of Proposition 2.)








1;std and thus it holds that q
2 < q
1.
Proof of Proposition 5
For the derivation of the expected time of adoption assuming l1 > 0 two
cases have to be distinguished: For l1  l2, just threshold q
1 is considered
for adoption and therefore the derivation of the expected time of adoption
follows straightforwardly assuming equation (4.14). For case l1 > l2, both
thresholds have to be considered for the optimal adoption time. In this case
the company will wait at least IE[T](M(q
2)) plus a time IE[Tplus], where Tplus
is the time it takes to reach ﬁrst q
2 if the arrival rate is l2 (which occurs after
time D), or reach q
1, if the arrival rate is l1 (which occurs before time D).




u e, then n denotes the necessary number of extra
jumps that we need in order to reach the investment level q
1, whereas if we
just need j  n  1 jumps then it means that we are above q
2 level (but under
q




> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
D with probability P(X > D)
X + D with probability P(X < D)P(X > D)
2X + D with probability P(X < D)2P(X > D)
...
(n   1)X + D with probability P(X < D)n 1P(X > D)
nX with probability P(X < D)n
9
> > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > ;
(4.52)
Therefore, the expression for IE[T] stated in equation (4.16) follows.
Case l1 = 0: in this case the optimal investment policy is driven only by
q




the expected time until adoption is according to equation (4.17). 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Denote by x(l) the solution of equation (4.4) and let F(.) denote the following
function:
F(x(l)) = (r + l)x(l)b   l(x(l) + u)b.
If we prove that the solution of the above equation is increasing with l, then
so is the solution of equation (4.4). According to the theorem of the implicitCHAPTER 4 119
function, the proof that the optimal adoption threshold is increasing in the







for all l > 0. Thus, as for b > 0, (x(l) + u)b > x(l)b, one needs to prove that
b(r + l)x(l)b 1   lb(x(l) + u)b 1 > 0.
If b = 1, then the above inequality follows trivially. If b < 1: as r > 0, then it
follows that
b(r + l)x(l)b 1   lb(x(l) + u)b 1 > lb(x(l)b 1   (x(l) + u)b 1).
For b < 1, the function x(l)b 1 is decreasing in x and therefore it holds that
x(l)b 1 > (x(l) + u)b 1. Thus inequality (4.53) is proven. Note that it is also
possible that for b > 1 the optimal adoption threshold can also be increasing
in the arrival rate. For instance, for b = 2 we have that q is the solution of the
following equation:









which is clearly increasing with l. 2
Proof of Proposition 7
Assuming case q
1 > q
2 we want to derive the probability that having reached
a q-level q 2 [q
2,q
2 + u), region 2 will be reached before the technology
level has increased up to a level greater than q
1. This probability is given
by one minus the probability that threshold q
1 will be reached, i.e. if and
only if the following ˆ n jumps arrive within a time period smaller than D.




u e jumps (having reached a q-
level 2 [q
2,q
2 + u)) occur within a time interval (0,D), lays in the interval
2 [P(X < D)ˆ n,P(X < D)ˆ n 1] = [(1   e l1D)ˆ n,(1   e l1D)ˆ n 1] depending on
the speciﬁc q-level. Taking the reciprocal of this leads to the result.
Proof of Proposition 8
The result follows in view of the equations (4.9) and (4.10) and in view of the
fact that, if D is exponentially distributed then the probability of an arrival in120 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION








r + l1 + m
. (4.55)
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